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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 30

(e) Review By the Witness; Changes.

(1) Review; Statement of Changes. On request by the deponent or a party before the deposition is completed, the deponent must be allowed 30 days after being notified by the officer that the transcript or recording is available in which:

(A) to review the transcript or recording; and

(B) if there are changes in form or substance, to sign a statement listing the changes and the reasons for making them.

(2) Changes Indicated in the Officer's Certificate. The officer must note in the certificate prescribed by Rule 30(f)(1) whether a review was requested and, if so, must attach any changes the deponent makes during the 30-day period.

DISCLAIMER: THE FOREGOING FEDERAL PROCEDURE RULES ARE PROVIDED FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY.

THE ABOVE RULES ARE CURRENT AS OF APRIL 1, 2019. PLEASE REFER TO THE APPLICABLE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR UP-TO-DATE INFORMATION.

VERITEXT LEGAL SOLUTIONS

COMPANY CERTIFICATE AND DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Veritext Legal Solutions represents that the foregoing transcript is a true, correct and complete transcript of the colloquies, questions and answers as submitted by the court reporter. Veritext Legal Solutions further represents that the attached exhibits, if any, are true, correct and complete documents as submitted by the court reporter and/or attorneys in relation to this deposition and that the documents were processed in accordance with our litigation support and production standards.

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U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA



Exhibit B

Race and Politics in Twentieth-Century Alabama

Report Prepared By:

Kari Frederickson, PhD
University of Alabama
May 17, 2024

My qualifications

I am a Professor of History at the University of Alabama. My area of expertise is twentieth century American history with a particular focus on the history of the South. I earned my Ph.D. from Rutgers University in 1996. I began my career at the University of Central Florida and have been at the University of Alabama since 1999. Since becoming a professional historian I have taught undergraduate and graduate courses on U.S. history, the history of the American South, the Civil Rights Movement, American political history since the 1960s, and Alabama history. I have supervised more than 30 Masters students and 15 doctoral students. I have conducted research at the National Archives, the Library of Congress, the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, and at state and university archives across the South. I currently serve on the Board of Directors of the Harry S. Truman Library Institute and am chairperson of the Institute's Research Grants Committee.

To date I have published four books with highly regarded academic presses. My scholarship focuses on the political, social, and cultural history of the twentieth-century South. *The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 1932-1968*, was published by the University of North Carolina Press in 2001 and won the Harry S. Truman Book Award in 2002. *Cold War Dixie: Militarization and Modernization in the American South* was published by the University of Georgia Press in 2013 and won the Southern Historical Association's Bennett H. Wall Prize for the Best Book in Southern Economic History in 2014. My latest book, *Deep South Dynasty: The Bankheads of Alabama*, was published by the University of Alabama Press in 2022 and won the Gulf South Historical Association's Michael V. R. Thomason Award for the Best Book on the Gulf South. I have published an additional 19 scholarly articles and essays in peer-reviewed publications. I have served as a consultant and on-camera expert for six documentaries, most

recently for *The Blinding of Isaac Woodard*, part of PBS's prestigious American Experience series. I was awarded a research grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities and have served as a member of the NEH's grants review committee.

Method of Report

The following report is based on research in a wide range of primary and secondary sources in the political history of Alabama and the South. I have conducted research in relevant gubernatorial papers and in the State Democratic Executive Committee Papers held at the Alabama Department of Archives and History, as well as relevant state and local newspapers. I have consulted more than forty scholarly books and articles on political development in Alabama and the South.

Summary of My Opinion

Race has served as a dividing line in political allegiance and activity since the period of Reconstruction. In particular, the ability of first the Democratic Party and later, the Republican Party, to achieve viability and dominance has depended on each party's ability to secure the support of white voters through racial appeals. The Democratic Party succeeded in establishing itself as the defender of white supremacy following the disfranchisement campaign of the late nineteenth/early twentieth century, and through the leveraging of cultural symbols and historical memory. From the 1920s through roughly the 1960s, southern Democrats achieved seniority in the national party, which allowed them to protect white racial customs and made them almost impossible to challenge. The Republican Party overcame considerable hostility and gained relevancy, competitiveness, and ultimately dominance in Alabama by branding itself the "white party" as the Civil Rights Movement gained traction locally and garnered support from the

National Democratic Party. The Republican Party's ability to exploit white racial anxiety beginning in the early 1960s and later, in the 1980s, by developing conservative policy positions with race at the center, allowed it to attract a growing number of white voters, first at the presidential level, and later in down-ballot races. It also successfully appropriated cultural symbols and utilized historical memory that at one time had been the sole possession of the Democrats. Today, the parties are racially polarized; most whites are Republicans and most Blacks are Democrats. With white identity politics occupying the center of Republican politics, creating effective and enduring bi-racial coalitions is extremely difficult, if not impossible.

Introduction

For the breadth of the twentieth century, political party identity in the State of Alabama has been largely defined by race. The Democratic Party's disfranchisement campaign at the turn of the century and its dedication to the maintenance of white supremacy through a variety of means secured its dominance in Alabama for much of the twentieth century. The resurgence and competitiveness of the Republican Party in national and state elections beginning in the mid-1960s depended heavily on the party's ability to define itself as the "white man's" party. With race as the primary political dividing line throughout much of the century, creating bi-racial coalitions -- whether overtly political or not -- was nearly impossible and actively resisted.

Disfranchisement

Democratic Party dominance in Alabama was achieved at the turn of the twentieth century through the promotion of a political message that emphasized the protection of white supremacy and through a new constitution that eliminated political competition from the

Republican Party and from disgruntled white Democrats unhappy with the state party by disfranchising the mass of Black voters and many poor white voters.

White voters' hostility toward the Republican Party began prior to the Civil War but really took root during the period known as Radical Reconstruction, roughly 1868-1874. The Republican Party held majority power in Congress from 1868 to 1872, and was responsible for passage of the 14th amendment, which established citizenship rights for all persons born in the United States, and the 15th amendment, which forbade states from denying citizens the right to vote based on race. During the period of Radical Reconstruction, freedmen in Alabama became registered voters, participated in a biracial Republican Party, and held political office. The Democratic Party became identified with the return of white supremacy, and Democrats used a variety of means – primarily fraud and violence – to intimidate Republican voters and regain control of state government in 1874. Despite the continuation of these intimidation methods, Republican voters, both Black and white, continued to participate in state and national politics, posing a persistent threat to the Democratic Party.¹

The 1901 constitution incorporated multiple suffrage obstacles that were devastatingly effective, particularly in the state's majority Black counties. In 1900, before the new requirements went into effect, and despite decades of fraud and intimidation, some 79,311 Black voters appeared on the rolls in fourteen Black Belt counties. Once the constitution went into effect, barely over a thousand remained. Statewide, by 1908, Alabama counted a mere 3,742 registered Black voters. Although not quite as dramatic as the losses incurred by Black voters, voter registration among poor white Alabamians suffered a decline that increased with the passage of time. By 1942, Alabama had only 440,291 registered voters but some six hundred thousand disfranchised white people.² The strongest deterrent to white registration was the poll

tax. With these voters essentially silenced, the threat of political rebellion grounded in shared economic grievance was eliminated. The era of ballot stuffing came to an end, and any hope of a political coalition made up of Black and poor white voters grounded in economic concerns was dealt a severe blow.

As a consequence of disfranchisement, the State of Alabama and much of the South became a one-party region. Unchallenged by Republicans, Democratic officeholders easily won re-election, gaining seniority in the House of Representatives and the Senate. During periods in which Democrats were in the majority, especially beginning in 1932, seniority brought committee chairmanships and extraordinary power to kill any legislation that threatened white supremacy. Although southern congressmen and senators might disagree on matters of economic or foreign policy, on issues of race, they voted as a block and maintained extraordinary unanimity. The Democratic Party, whose official symbol from 1904 to 1966 featured a rooster and the slogan “White Supremacy, For the Right,” reigned supreme in Alabama for the next eighty years.

Democratic Party and Culture

Achieving political hegemony was as much a cultural as a political battle. Having established their political hegemony through disfranchisement, white Democrats had to legitimize their continued control. The dominance and legitimacy of the Democratic Party drew strength from historical memory, giving the party a cultural power that exceeded that of a typical political party and made creating anything resembling a coalition to challenge its rule nearly impossible. In addition to creating constitutional barriers to electoral participation, white Democrats crafted a strong cultural narrative about the superiority of the Democratic Party and the corresponding illegitimacy of the Republican Party.

Democrats established their legitimacy as the ruling party by creating a particular interpretation of the southern past and the southern present that made a virtue of white elite Democratic rule, denigrated Black culture, perpetuated a fear and hatred of Black political participation and the Republican Party, and taught reverence for the antebellum South and the Confederacy. The antebellum South and Confederacy, and the Democratic Party, were commemorated through the erection of monuments; through public lectures and celebrations; through the publication, circulation, and adoption in public schools of approved works of fiction and history; and through the creation of state cultural institutions such as the Alabama Department of Archives and History. Thomas McAdory Owen and Marie Bankhead Owen, directors of the archives for over fifty years and both children of Confederate veterans, made it their mission to erase Republican contributions from history. Tom Owen refused to collect or subsequently destroyed any Reconstruction-era manuscript collections that documented Republican contributions.³

Marie Bankhead Owen's greatest victory in her quest to purge any hint of Republicanism from Alabama's public face came in her campaign to change the state seal and the state motto in the 1930s. In 1868, the Republican legislature elected during Radical Reconstruction created a state seal. This particular legislature was dominated by the Republican Party, which was comprised of white and Black lawmakers. For Bankhead Owen, this 1868 seal was a "monstrosity": the Radical Reconstruction legislature that created it was politically illegitimate, having been created by "the Carpetbag Legislature, made up of men who were strangers to our traditions, and in the main of local renegades and negroes." She also created a new state motto: "We Dare Defend Our Rights," a declaration of the rights of states to defend themselves against the tyranny of federal power.⁴ Given her antipathy for the period of Radical Reconstruction, and

in particular that era's biracial legislatures' support for the 14th and 15th amendments, the "rights" she sought to "defend" were the right of whites to police race relations without federal interference. In 1939, the state legislature adopted the new seal and motto designed by Bankhead Owen. They remain Alabama state symbols more than eighty years later.

Redistricting in 1916

Disfranchisement, although devastating, still did not completely eliminate Republican voting. In counties such as Walker, Fayette, and Winston, the Republican Party maintained a pesky presence. A persistent minority was not to be tolerated, and the Democrats sought other means to further eviscerate Republican power. Congressional redistricting provided another tool through which to further undermine Republican Party viability. Democrats found their opportunity following the 1910 census; Alabama's population growth had earned it an additional congressional representative. For the 1912 and 1914 legislative sessions, a stopgap measure had been instituted, and the seat had been filled by election of a congressman-at-large. A permanent redistricting of the state needed to be undertaken. John Bankhead Jr. of Jasper, son of a United States congressman and author of the enabling legislation that activated the voting obstacles in the 1901 Constitution, drafted the initial legislation creating the new Tenth District. Comprising Fayette, Franklin, Lamar, Marion, Pickens, Walker, and Winston, the Tenth would take four counties from the Sixth, two from the Seventh, and one from the Ninth. Bankhead and the bill's supporters in the state legislature were transparent about their partisan goals: the creation of the new district would help Democratic candidates in the Seventh Congressional District by siphoning off some Republican voters. The bill to create the new Tenth District would dilute this Republican strength and thus make all Alabama congressional districts safely Democratic. Doing so would protect white supremacy. This was something upon which all Democrats could agree.

The bill passed by a razor thin margin on the last day of the legislative session in September 1915.⁵

1928 Bolt and Heflin

The Democratic Party not only implemented measures by which to dilute and eliminate competition from Republicans. It sought to punish individual Democrats who supported Republican candidates. Any deviation from Democratic Party allegiance was deemed a threat to the maintenance of white supremacy. White Democrats who abandoned the Democratic Party to support a Republican candidate during any given election could expect punishment regardless of the individual's white supremacist credentials.

The greatest threat to Democratic party hegemony came in 1928, when the National Democratic Party nominated New York Governor Alfred E. Smith as its presidential candidate. Smith was an Irish Catholic and a foe of prohibition and supported repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. Protestant leaders across the South expressed fear of Smith's candidacy; many wondered whether cultural and religious concerns might trump race in this campaign, leading some white southern voters to abandon the Democratic candidate to support the hated Republicans and their popular candidate Herbert Hoover.

The anti-Smith forces in Alabama were led by United States Senator J. Thomas Heflin. Nicknamed "Cotton Tom" for his advocacy on behalf of the state's cotton farmers, Heflin was one of the more colorful politicians of that or any time. Elected to Congress in 1904, Heflin served eight terms in the House and won election to the U.S. Senate in 1920. Heflin was best known for his strident anti-Catholicism, his support of prohibition, and his virulent white supremacy. Repulsed by Democratic presidential candidate Al Smith, Heflin embarked on a full-

fledged political revolt, determined to swing the state to Republican nominee Herbert Hoover, calling Smith a “Negro bootlicker” who favored interracial marriage. Heflin further charged that the New York governor had appointed African Americans to government jobs, giving them supervisory power over white female employees. Speaking in the city of Dothan in October 1928, Heflin painted Smith as the harbinger of a racial apocalypse, claiming that Smith “is in favor of appointing negroes to office where they will be in authority over white people” and declaring that “there are now dance halls in New York City...where every night negro men dance with white women and white men dance with negro women.” Alarmed by Heflin’s bolt, the state Democratic Party countered with an attack of their own, depicting Hoover as a supporter of racial equality and reminding white Democratic voters of the tragedy of Reconstruction, when carpetbaggers invaded the South and freedmen served in the legislature. A vote for Herbert Hoover, they cried, meant a return to Black domination.

The turnout for the 1928 presidential election was one of the largest in Alabama history. Ultimately, party loyalty, cultural antipathy towards the Republican Party, and the Democrats’ history of protecting white supremacy trumped religious bigotry and fear of revocation of the Eighteenth Amendment, but just barely. Al Smith carried Alabama by a mere seven thousand votes; roughly one hundred thousand Alabama Democrats voted for Herbert Hoover. For many white voters, it was their first time supporting a Republican. Despite the fact that Hoover had lost, Senator Tom Heflin, whose support for white supremacy was nearly unparalleled, paid a political price for abandoning the Democrats and making common cause with the Republicans. Party loyalty was a serious matter. Up for re-election in 1930, Heflin was barred by the State Democratic Executive Committee from running as a Democrat. Denied the powerful Democratic Party affiliation, Heflin attempted to create a coalition of disgruntled Democrats and

Republicans but ultimately lost the election to John Bankhead Jr. His political career never recovered.

Biracial coalitions, Part I: Organized Labor

The severe prohibition against political coalitions that threatened white supremacy extended beyond politics to broader Alabama society. Difficult economic conditions that hit both white and Black at times precipitated the creation of biracial coalitions to address challenging circumstances. Time after time, these coalitions were attacked by the political and economic elite who saw in such coalitions a threat to white supremacy as well as to profits.

The growth of industry in Alabama in the postbellum era was predicated upon a racially stratified labor force. An industrial workforce divided by race gave owners a powerful tool to keep wages low. The often-violent backlash against the organizing of Black and white laborers in particular into labor unions made the potential for a political coalition based on shared economic grievance highly unlikely. The defense of white supremacist ideology, politics, and social practices undermined and outright sought to destroy interracial coalitions.

The rise of the steel industry, and the mining of the coal and iron ore on which it depended, brought waves of black and white migrants to the area around Birmingham in search of better wages and relief from rural poverty. Early on, a mixed workforce began to emerge in the Birmingham District. By 1900, more than half of the mining workforce in the Birmingham coal fields was Black. Alabama's competitive edge hinged on coal operators' ability to keep wages low. Despite deep cleavages between white and black miners, the history of the industry illustrates moments when the two groups made nearly heroic attempts to unify to address extremely harsh working conditions and low pay, only to be undermined and destroyed by the

power of capital, often assisted by the military power of the state. The United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) made repeated efforts in the Alabama coalfields to galvanize interracial unity in pursuit of better working conditions and higher pay. Alabama's miners affiliated with the UMWA in April 1890, becoming known as UMW District 20.

By 1903, the UMWA had more than 95 locals and 14,000 members in District 20. After coal operators cut their wages in 1908, UMWA miners – Black and white – went on strike. The two-month strike was marked by armed confrontations between striking miners and guards employed by the coal companies. Prominent mine owners excoriated the union's biracial composition, encouraged white citizens to take vigilante action against the members of the union, and appealed to Governor Braxton Bragg Comer to lend military assistance to the owners in putting down the strike. After two months of violent labor confrontations, Governor Comer mobilized the Alabama National Guard to break the strike. Coal miners went on strike again, this time to protest the rollback of wage and other gains achieved during World War I. Once again, the governor (this time, Thomas Kilby) used troops to break the strike.⁶

Biracial coalitions, Part II: Great Depression: Southern Conference for Human Welfare

The conditions that befell white and Black Alabamians during the Great Depression once again provided a context within which some sought to create coalitions to address the state's and region's needs. One such coalition was the Southern Conference for Human Welfare (SCHW). Founded in 1938, the SCHW was a coalition of groups and individuals interested in expanding New Deal-style reforms in the South to accelerate economic recovery while also opening the door to democratic reforms. Drawing support from organized labor, civil rights organizations, and a few traditional Democratic political leaders, the SCHW held its inaugural meeting in Birmingham in 1938. Roughly one-quarter of the delegates who attended the three-day meeting

were Black. The organization's support for interracial labor organizing, such as that undertaken by the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), as well as its opposition to the poll tax made the SCHW a target of mainstream politicians in Alabama and throughout the South. Although members of the Communist Party participated in the SCHW, the organization was by no means a communist organization. Nevertheless, the organization's refusal to take a staunch anti-communist stance in the post-war era made it vulnerable to anti-communist attacks. The organization folded in 1948.

Turning point: World War II

The onset of World War II precipitated changes in Alabama and across the region that put increasing pressure on those dedicated to maintaining white supremacy. Massive numbers of Black southerners migrated north and west in search of wartime employment. Once settled in their new communities, these new residents became registered voters. The Great Depression and the Democratic Party's New Deal had prompted Black voters (even those few in the South) to support the Democratic Party after decades of support for the party of Lincoln. "The switch was abrupt. In 1932 Roosevelt received only 23 percent of the Black vote; in 1936 he received 71 percent."⁷ Now, with significant growth of Black voters in the North, for the first time in the twentieth century, civil rights moved onto the agendas of both national political parties eager to win these new voters, and African American veterans returned home determined to fight for democracy in their communities.

The most direct assault on the region's anti-democratic political machinery came from the United States Supreme Court in its 1944 decision in the Texas case of Smith v. Allwright. The court ruled that the Texas white primary law violated the Fifteenth Amendment and was therefore unconstitutional. While the states of the Upper South acquiesced in the ruling, the

decision was a political bombshell in the Deep South, where white Democrats scrambled to shore up the political barriers to Black voting. Alabama's governor, Frank Dixon, wrote of his concern to the head of the state Democratic Party. "It is obvious that the only thing that has held the Democratic Party together in the South for many years past has been the thing which caused its strength in the first place, namely, white supremacy." If the national Democratic Party followed the Supreme Court's lead "through forced registration of negroes in the State, the Democratic Party will become anathema to the white people in the South."⁸ State senator and U.S. Senate candidate James Simpson regarded the *Smith* decision as "the gravest threat to white supremacy since Reconstruction."⁹ The *Smith* decision and service in the war for democracy galvanized groups of Black voters in Alabama. Determined to stifle Black political participation, in 1901 the Alabama legislature passed, and voters approved, the Boswell Amendment to the state constitution. This amendment introduced new suffrage standards that required potential voters to "read and write, understand and explain any article of the Constitution of the United States" and granted local boards the power to administer registration requirements "in as discriminatory a fashion as they saw fit."¹⁰

Southern Democrats' unanimity on issues of race and their immense power in Congress allowed them to kill any legislation that threatened white supremacy.¹¹ But that stranglehold was starting to loosen ever so slightly in the late 1940s. The recent war for democracy, the growth of an increasingly vocal Black citizenry in northern cities, the mobilization of Black southern voters, and a rash of violence against Black veterans across the South in the postwar era emboldened President Harry Truman to challenge the power of Southern Democrats to dictate the party's allegiance to white supremacy. In February 1948, during an election year, Truman submitted a civil rights package to Congress that included anti-poll tax and anti-lynching

legislation, as well as a permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission that would make employment discrimination illegal. Truman expected an outcry from southern white Democrats, but predicted that white southerners' historic allegiance to the party would win out, and that they would ultimately support him in the presidential election in November.

He was wrong. A group of southern Democrats – apoplectic at the thought that the party that had for so long served as the protector of white supremacy was now pursuing Black voters – staged a political revolt. Unsuccessful in preventing a civil rights plank in the Democratic party platform and in denying Truman the Democratic party's nomination, this group of disgruntled white Democrats created their own party to challenge the Democrats and Republicans in November and to protect white supremacy. Its official name was the States' Rights Democratic Party, but it was more popularly known as the Dixiecrats. Alabama was among the strongest Dixiecrat states, with former Governor Frank Dixon, state party chair Gessner McCorvey, and attorney and political insider Horace Wilkinson as its most vocal leaders. McCorvey pledged to defeat Truman's "damnable, obnoxious, and unthinkable" civil rights program.¹² Others compared Truman's program to the dark days of Reconstruction, when "federal bayonets...[forced] the negro down our throats." Horace Wilkinson was more blunt: if southern Democrats submitted to Truman's wishes, they might as well "haul down the Democratic flag [and] submit to nigger rule."¹³ The Dixiecrats succeeded in hijacking the state party and running the Dixiecrat presidential and vice-presidential candidates under the "Democratic Party" label. The Dixiecrats also appropriated "the most powerful cultural symbols associated with" the Confederacy, including the Confederate battle flag and portraits of Confederate heroes.¹⁴ Democrats were forced to list President Truman and his running mate on the ballot as the nominees of the "National Democratic Party." Alabama's governor, James Folsom, its two

Senators, and its entire Congressional delegation remained loyal to the president; but that loyalty did not mean they supported Truman's civil rights program. Rather, they supported the national nominee because they believed Alabama (and the South's) continued allegiance to the Democratic Party remained the surest way to defeat any civil rights proposals. Although the Dixiecrat effort was defeated, the 1948 political bolt was a turning point for some white southerners as they began to question their historic allegiance to the Democratic Party as the best vehicle through which to preserve white supremacy.

Following the 1948 presidential election, politics in Alabama and across the South entered into a long transitional period in which the right to claim the mantle of the defender of white supremacy shifted slowly from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party. This shift occurred first at the presidential election level, and voters – particularly white voters – in Alabama adhered to this shift primarily in national elections over the next thirty years. Although it had been possible to support the economic liberalism of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal while maintaining support for segregation and white supremacy, Truman's civil rights program (although ultimately defeated in Congress) incorporated racial liberalism into the national party's profile that only grew more intertwined in the coming decades; by the 1980s, "liberalism" had become anathema to southern white voters. According to one historian, "the word could not be uttered in an economic sense without also conjuring the culturally fatal albatross of racial inclusion."¹⁵

In the immediate aftermath of the 1948 election, the Democratic Party in Alabama sought to reclaim its reputation as the best vehicle through which to protect white supremacy.¹⁶ Hence it sought to eliminate the possibility of a future Dixiecrat-like bolt. In 1951, the state Party passed a loyalty oath that effectively made a repeat of the Dixiecrat Revolt in 1952 an impossibility. With

another hijacking of the Democratic Party machinery now off the table, prominent Dixiecrats in the state looked for other party options, among them, the dreaded Republican Party. Birmingham columnist and Dixiecrat supporter John Temple Graves told a gathering of former Democrats, "Let us not wince anymore when we hear the word Republican."¹⁷ Abandoning the Democratic Party, with its historic allegiance to the defense of white supremacy, would take some time.

The 1950s: A Period of Transition

Despite President Truman's embrace of civil rights, the majority of white southern voters remained in the Democratic column. As of 1950, not a single Senator from the South was a Republican, and only 2 out of 105 southern members of Congress were Republicans. The party's prospects for the South improved when, after 1948, the Republican party began to lose favor with Black voters. This realization prompted some Republicans to look to the South, which the national party had neglected for generations.¹⁸ Aware of a potentially significant independent white southern vote, the national Republican Party welcomed the disgruntled Dixiecrats. At a Lincoln Day rally of Alabama Republicans in Birmingham in early February, Republican National Chairman Guy Gabrielson made a strong pitch to win Alabama Dixiecrats over to the GOP. Gabrielson declared, "We want the Dixiecrats to vote for our candidate. The Dixiecrat movement is an anti-Truman movement. The Dixiecrat party believes in states' rights. That's what the Republican party believes in."¹⁹

In 1952, the national Democratic Party nominated Illinois senator Adlai Stevenson and U.S. Senator from Alabama John Sparkman as its presidential and vice-presidential candidates in 1952. The party's platform contained a much weaker civil rights platform than it had in 1948; furthermore, many Alabama Dixiecrats recognized the futility of opposing a Democratic ticket that carried the state's own Senator. Still, having made the break in 1948, many former

Dixiecrats could not go back. Several threw their lot in with Republicans. Tom Abernethy of Talladega, a 1948 Dixiecrat elector and 1950 States' Rights campaign chairperson, resigned his position on the State Democratic Executive Committee in July and stumped the state for Republican candidate Eisenhower. A number of other influential Dixiecrats eventually threw their support to the general, including state chairman Gessner McCorvey, textile magnate Donald Comer, Dothan banker Wallace Malone, and Montgomery construction king Winton M. Blount, who would later serve as Richard Nixon's postmaster general. Despite the desire to create new in-roads into Alabama and the other southern states, the national Republican Party reflected Eisenhower's relatively moderate position on civil rights during the 1950s. Eisenhower captured several upper South states and did well with middle- and upper-class white voters in the region's metropolitan areas in 1952 and 1956, but his victories did not have much in the way of coattails.²⁰

During Eisenhower's presidency, the Republican Party focused more intently on forging inroads into the South. It created a "Southern Division" to begin the long process of party-building in the region. Prior to the 1950s, the Republican Party was simply a patronage machine with very little institutional presence in Alabama or elsewhere. According to one observer, prior to the 1960s, the Republican Party in the South "operated from briefcases and transient filing cabinets..."²² With a slightly more robust party machinery, 1960 Republican Party presidential candidate Richard Nixon hoped to build upon Eisenhower's toehold in the region. Nixon possessed a stronger commitment to racial equality than had Eisenhower, but he kept it relatively muted during the campaign and the party adopted a civil rights plank that was weaker than its Democratic counterpart. The shedding of Black voters that had begun in 1948 accelerated. Nixon adopted rhetoric that was familiar to white southerners, affirming that the Republican Party stood

for states' rights; he also mostly avoided mentioning the most famous of Republicans. Abraham Lincoln. Nixon hoped to expand upon Eisenhower's gains in southern metropolitan areas among what were referred to as "country-club Republicans," and was aided in his quest for white southern votes by southern middlemen like Birmingham newspaperman John Temple Graves, who now saw the Republican Party as the best vehicle through which to preserve segregation and white political control.

Despite a stronger party apparatus, Nixon was unable to build upon Eisenhower's record in the South. He carried Florida, Tennessee and Virginia. He was not racially conservative enough to convince a sufficient number of southern white voters in the Deep South to abandon their historic conceptions of the parties. The Republicans also failed to add any additional House seats. Nixon did worse with Black voters than did Eisenhower, winning 32% to Eisenhower's 39%, further convincing some in the party that its future lay with white southern voters. Alabama voters stuck with the Democratic Party in part because of the presence of Texan Lyndon Johnson on the ticket; still, a sufficient number of voters were unhappy with the party's position on civil rights to choose six unpledged presidential electors.²³

The Republican Party's Right Turn: Becoming the White Party

Following Nixon's defeat, conservative Republicans, a small but increasingly vocal and determined group, argued that the party needed to focus more aggressively on white voters in the South. United States Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona, champion of this emerging conservative wing of the party, argued that Nixon's moderate approach to civil rights would continue to be a losing approach. The party's future, Goldwater argued, lay with white voters in the South. At a meeting of southern Republicans shortly following Nixon's defeat, Goldwater famously declared. "We're not going to get the Negro vote as a bloc in 1964 and 1968, so we

ought to go hunting where the ducks are.”²⁴ Following Goldwater’s advice, the RNC devoted roughly a third of its annual budget to southern organizing. Within a few years, the party had a presence in 87 percent of southern counties, and many of these new Republicans were staunch segregationists.²⁵ The Republican Party had made a deliberate decision to brand itself as a “white party,” focusing its publicity activities on white voters in the South.²⁶

1962 Hill-Martin Race: A Response to Civil Rights

The Republican Party began making in-roads with white voters in Alabama and the South in the early 1960s as the Civil Rights Movement began gaining traction. The Kennedy administration proved more willing than the previous administration to aid the burgeoning movement, supporting the anti-poll tax amendment, helping to protect the Freedom Riders in Alabama, and aiding in the integration of the University of Mississippi. In 1962, the Republican Party fielded candidates in 7 US Senate races and 113 House races in the South.²⁷

The first serious challenge from a Republican candidate in Alabama came in 1962 when Gadsden businessman James D. Martin challenged incumbent United States Senator Lister Hill.²⁸ Elected to the House of Representatives in 1923 and to the United States Senate in 1958, Hill distinguished himself first as a staunch New Deal Democrat and later as an advocate for expanded access to health care. Hill was a pro-segregationist Democratic loyalist who opposed the Dixiecrat revolt, viewing the seniority of southern senators and representatives within the Democratic Party as the surest way to defeat civil rights legislation. Martin was a political unknown, a free-enterprise Dixiecrat-turned-“Goldwater Republican” who was an economic and racial conservative. He opposed federal civil rights initiatives and regarded programs such as national aid to education and social security as programs indicative of “dangerous socialistic trends.”²⁹ He regarded Democratic Party leaders as “anti-South” in their attitudes.³⁰ In accepting

the state party's nomination for the right to challenge Hill. Martin co-opted and embraced the powerful historical memory that had been the sole property of Democrats for a century. He called for "a return to the spirit of '61 – 1861, when our fathers formed a new nation" to support their principles. "God willing," Martin concluded, "we will not again be forced to take up rifle and bayonet to preserve these principles...Make no mistake, my friends, this will be a fight. The bugle call is loud and clear! The South has risen!"

Martin's attacks on Hill grew more aggressive when he turned to the issue of civil rights. Despite Hill's opposition to federal intervention into what he believed to be the rights of the states, Martin compared Hill's record to that of African American Congressman Adam Clayton Powell of New York.³¹ On the campaign trail, he referred to President Kennedy's use of federal marshals during the Freedom Riders episode as a "federal invasion of Montgomery."³² He accused Attorney General Bobby Kennedy of "tearing like a predator...at the [voter] registration laws in Alabama..."³³ In the fall, President Kennedy sent federal troops to Oxford, Mississippi, to quell the violence that had erupted when James Meredith integrated the University of Mississippi. Martin called Kennedy's actions "another Reconstruction."³⁴ Martin sent a letter of support to Mississippi governor Ross Barnett, praising what he called the governor's "gallant defense of the sovereign state of Mississippi and its institutions" and pledged his support "in your fight against federal pressure and the intervention of your state's rights..."³⁵ The *Birmingham News* carried the story of Martin's defense of Barnett accompanied by a photo of Martin in front of a Confederate battle flag.³⁶ Martin declared that he was running to "keep the Kennedys from doing to Alabama what they're doing to Mississippi..."³⁷

When the votes were tallied, observers were shocked that veteran Senator and anti-civil rights Democrat Lister Hill had barely survived, eeking by with a 6,803-vote margin of victory.

Hill's support was greatest among the state's few black voters and rural whites in northern Alabama. Martin's biggest gains over totals achieved by Eisenhower in 1956 occurred in counties with large Black majorities. A majority of Alabama's white voters supported Martin.³⁸

Presidential Election of 1964: Five States for Goldwater

Martin's near-toppling of a sitting senator gave hope to the Republican Party that it was on the right track. As the decade progressed, the Democratic Party increasingly aligned itself with the goals of the Civil Rights Movement. Lyndon Johnson assumed the presidency upon Kennedy's assassination and declared his determination to become the "civil rights president." He made good on his promise. In July 1964, the president signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a broad desegregation bill.

The year 1964 promised a continuation of Republican inroads as well as a further distancing between the state Democratic Party and the National Democratic Party on the issue of civil rights. President Lyndon Johnson had become anathema to many southern white voters. Many searched for an alternative and found it in Republican Party nominee Barry Goldwater. Goldwater voted against the Civil Rights Act because he did not believe federal enforcement was possible and state and local enforcement was preferable. He insisted that "the more the Federal government has attempted to legislate morality, the more it actually has incited hatred and violence."³⁹ Goldwater received a warm welcome from white voters in Alabama and was even endorsed by the Grand Dragon of the state chapter of the Ku Klux Klan.⁴⁰ George Wallace, the state's segregationist governor, had temporarily tested the waters during the Democratic primary but eventually withdrew; recognizing Goldwater's appeal to white voters in Alabama and across the Deep South, Wallace offered himself as a possible running mate for the Arizona Senator, who politely declined. During the campaign, Goldwater embraced former Dixiecrat candidate Strom

Thurmond (now a United States Senator), who switched his party identification to Republican. On election day, Goldwater had flipped five southern states, including Alabama, where he garnered nearly 70 percent of the vote. Unlike Eisenhower, whose southern strength lay in the Upper South and in the region's metropolitan areas, Goldwater's greatest margins of victory came from counties with Black majorities, places "where any change to the racial pecking order proved the most alarming."⁴¹

Republicans expanded their activity in southern congressional races in 1964, contesting 70 of 106 congressional districts in the South, "the largest number of Republican challenges in the post-World War II period."⁴² Seven of the ten new seats won by the Republican congressional party in the nation were from the Deep South: five from Alabama alone, where Republicans captured a majority of the state's congressional delegation for the first time since the era of Reconstruction. The role of race and civil rights in this election was clear. Upon switching to the Republican Party, candidate Bill Dickinson declared, "I have joined the white man's party." He continued, "It behooves us to support those who support us and our way of life."⁴³ The other four Republican congressmen from Alabama were similarly outspoken opponents of civil rights. One said that the Civil Rights Act "paved the way for the destruction of our liberties"; another called the day that it passed "Black Friday." Goldwater's victory in the South in 1964 initiated what political scientists Earl and Merle Black call part one of the "Great White Switch," in which southern white voters began to show greater preference for Republican presidential candidates.⁴⁴

Johnson followed up his 1964 landslide victory by signing the Voting Rights Act of 1965. He had accomplished the passage of these two watershed pieces of legislation with almost no support from southern Democrats. "[T]he southern Democrats' traditional strategy of legislative

obstruction on civil rights legislation was finally and convincingly repudiated." A united and bipartisan northern coalition had triumphed over southern obstruction.⁴⁵ Following passage of the Voting Rights Act, Black voter registration swelled, with the new voters overwhelmingly registering as Democrats. Alabama's first Black state legislators since Reconstruction assumed office in 1971.⁴⁶

Richard Nixon, George Wallace, and the Southern Strategy

Southern white votes were up for grabs in the 1968 presidential election as these voters turned their backs on the national Democratic Party. The passage that year of the Fair Housing Act and a U.S. Supreme Court decision that paved the way for the use of busing to achieve racial balance in public schools kept racial integration at the forefront of American politics. With staunch segregationist and American Independent Party candidate George Wallace in the race and sure to win the Deep South states, including his own, Republican candidate Richard Nixon took a more subtle, and ultimately enduring, rhetorical route to win white southern voters. Unlike Wallace, Nixon avoided supporting segregation openly. He developed what came to be known as a "southern strategy," which encompassed promises that appealed to white southerners (and many northerners as well) while avoiding the loss of moderate Republicans in the North. Nixon established a politically safe terrain by simultaneously affirming his belief in the principles of equality while opposing the use of federal intervention to enforce compliance. A majority of white Americans had come to believe that denial of basic citizenship rights was wrong, but they were opposed to the prospect of substantial residential and educational integration imposed by the courts and by the federal regulatory bureaucracy through involuntary mechanisms, especially busing.⁴⁷ Nixon likewise adopted language that originated with Wallace, embracing a tougher

“law and order” attitude that appealed to a “silent majority” that had grown weary of civil rights demands, urban uprisings, and anti-Vietnam War protests.

Nixon carried much of the upper South, taking five states back from the Democrats. George Wallace’s independent candidacy netted five southern states (including Alabama) and stymied Nixon’s effort to replicate Goldwater’s success in the Deep South. Nixon carried through on his promises of conservative judicial appointments, relaxed enforcement of school desegregation, and opposition to busing to achieve racial balance in public schools. He also sought to weaken provisions of the Voting Rights Act.⁴⁸ Although Alabama had gone for Wallace, *The Montgomery Advertiser* appeared satisfied with the Nixon agenda, telling its readers, “Nixon Keeps His Word.”⁴⁹ In 1972, with George Wallace out of the race, Nixon won the South with 60.7 percent of vote. This election represented the first time a Republican had won the South. Voters who had supported Wallace in 1968 overwhelmingly went to Nixon.⁵⁰

Stymied in the 1970s

The success of the Republican Party at the presidential level did not immediately translate down ballot. Despite Nixon’s success in 1972, and despite the fact that the National Democratic Party by 1972 had become increasingly fractured and defined by its liberal-reform wing that was dedicated to using federal machinery to expand and secure rights for those at society’s margins, southern Democrats in the House and the Senate withstood the Goldwater and Nixon challenges, successfully asserting their independence from the national party while establishing their conservative credentials. The Democrats continued to hold majorities in both houses, so southern senators in particular, who had cultivated party and senatorial seniority, continued to secure plum committee chairmanships. Strom Thurmond’s party switching remained a singular act; most senators and representatives were unwilling to give up their power

and influence to join the minority party on a matter of political principal. As long as they could keep some distance from the increasingly liberal national party, southern Democrats were safe. In 1972, Nixon's Postmaster General, Winton "Red" Blount, challenged incumbent Senator John Sparkman, but lost badly, garnering only 33 percent of the vote. Despite having been a member of the president's cabinet, the Republican Blount received tepid support from the president, who recognized Sparkman's relatively conservative voting record as more useful to his legislative program.⁵¹

The Watergate scandal, Richard Nixon's resignation, and the Democratic Party's nomination of white southern Baptist former Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter, slowed Republican gains down ballot. In Alabama specifically, the dominance and longevity of George Wallace retarded Republican development in the state. Wallace's strident racial appeals secured a base of support among white voters that Republicans found impossible to break.⁵² At the Congressional level, Alabama's delegation remained split during the 1970s and 1980s; two districts remained in Republican hands while a third, the Sixth District, went Republican in 1964 but returned to the Democratic column in 1983. The Democratic Party maintained in control of the state's two senate seats throughout the decade.

Black voters entered the political process as Democrats. Democrats remained competitive into the 1980s and 1990s because of their ability to create biracial coalitions. In order to grow, the Republican Party continued to lean into its appeals to white voters. Republican state house members broke into double digits only in the early 1980s and in the state senate in the 1990s. As the parties became more racially polarized in the 1980s and 1990s, and as more white voters migrated to the Republican Party, creating coalitions became increasingly difficult.

Ronald Reagan and the Great White Switch, Part II

The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and 1984 secured the second part of the “Great White Switch,” in which a majority of the South’s white voters not only *voted* Republican for the presidency, but also *identified* as Republicans. By 1992, 43 percent of white voters in the South regarded themselves as Republican, while 42 percent considered themselves Democrats. The Republicans had become competitive by relying almost exclusively on white southern voters.

The Republican Party in the 1980s did not shy away from racial messaging. Reagan kicked off his presidential campaign in Philadelphia, Mississippi, site of a horrific 1964 triple murder of civil rights activists that happened with the complicity of law enforcement. His declaration of his support for states’ rights was a not-so-subtle dog whistle to white southerners generally that his administration would not aggressively pursue remedies for racial discrimination. He promised the white voters in attendance that he intended to “restore to states and local governments the power that properly belongs to them.”⁵³ Republican strategist Lee Atwater in 1981 admitted that “The whole strategy was...based on coded racism. The whole thing.” Reagan’s vice president, George H.W. Bush, followed suit in his own presidential campaign in 1988. The infamous Willie Horton advertisement inextricably linked blackness, criminality, and liberalism – a linkage that originated with Nixon -- and hung it around the neck of Democratic Party candidate Governor Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts.⁵⁴

Under Reagan’s leadership, the Republican Party in the 1980s pursued a conservative agenda that, while not explicitly racist, had race at its center. Republicans pursued a range of policy prescriptions that relied on the belief that the Black community is marked by higher rates of crime and illegitimacy, a weakened family structure, low achievement in educational levels, and greater demands on the welfare system. Racial attitudes among southern Republicans in

particular reflected a resistance to government assistance to Blacks as a group and applying individualistic notions and standards to the situation of Black people in this country. Republicans asserted that inequality was not the result of the legacy of slavery or the long history of racial discrimination but rather is “a matter of effort, and if Blacks worked harder...they would achieve equal status in society.”⁵⁵ Poverty and incarceration, for example, were not the result of discrimination or over-policing of communities of color, but rather the result of poor choices. Government-led redistribution of resources to address inequality was, in the minds of Republicans, an example of anti-egalitarian special preference.

The racial polarization of the parties continued. Throughout the 1980s, southern Black Democratic support ranged between 76 and 94 percent, while the percentage of Blacks identifying themselves as Republican throughout the 1980s at no time was greater than 12 percent.⁵⁶ Race remained the political dividing line between the parties. By the 1980s, southern Democratic and Republican members of congress were voting differently on civil rights issues.⁵⁷ By the end of Reagan’s presidency, approximately 70 percent of all white southern voters were supporting Republican presidential candidates. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Republicans incorporated additional conservative themes of anti-feminism and religious fundamentalism that were interwoven with racial resentment. As one scholar has noted, “even when not directly on the surface, [race] lurks beneath nearly every issue in state politics.”⁵⁸ Polls have shown that white evangelicals are disproportionately more likely to voice support for policies and politicians that have racially conservative implications. In Alabama, Republican Jeremiah Denton, a religious conservative, captured a U.S. Senate seat in 1984 but through ineptitude lost it to conservative Democrat Richard Shelby in 1986. Shelby switched his party affiliation to Republican in 1994.

Building on the position that Nixon had pioneered and Reagan had expanded, by the end of the twentieth century, race and white anxiety formed the bedrock of conservative political ideology and was embedded in conflicts surrounding taxes, spending, education, crime, and welfare, as well as the promotion of what came to be known as “family values” issues. Racial attitudes became a central characteristic of both ideology and party identification, integral to voters’ choices between Democrats and Republicans.

Summary: The Late 20th Century and the Continuing Salience of Race

By the late twentieth century, the Republican Party’s electoral base resided solidly in the southern states. This remarkable political transformation was completed over the course of half a century. Since 1980, every Republican presidential candidate has carried a majority of ex-Confederate states, and in three elections (1984, 1988, and 2004) swept the region entirely. In Congress, the GOP has won a majority of southern seats in both the House and Senate since the 1994 midterm elections. The ability to attract a large majority of white voters in southern states has become pivotal to the party’s ability to win presidential elections and electoral majorities. In order to compete, beginning in the early 1960s, the Republican Party rebranded itself as a “white party” and adopted a host of conservative policy positions that had race at their core and which allowed it to compete effectively for white southern votes.⁵⁹ Since the 1970s, Democrats have lost seats in almost every legislative election cycle, due largely to their loss of support among rural white voters. Alabama elected its last Democratic governor in 1998. Today, nearly every Democratic lawmaker is Black and every Republican lawmaker is White.⁶⁰ Only 17 percent of white voters identify as Democrats, and only 15 percent of Black voters identify as Republicans.⁶¹ As Angie Maxwell and Todd Shields argue in their recent book, *The Long Southern Strategy*, “the decision to chase white southern voters in order to build a new

Republican coalition was not only intentional, strategic, and effective, but it was also unabating.”⁶² The consequence for Alabama is a politics that have become, in the words of one political scientist, “polarized and uncompetitive.”⁶³

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
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I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 17th day of May 2024, Tuscaloosa, Alabama.



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Education

Ph.D. Rutgers University, 1996
M.A. University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1991
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Employment

Chair, Department of History, University of Alabama, August 2010 to 2016.

Professor, Department of History, University of Alabama, 2014 to present.

Associate Professor, Department of History, University of Alabama, 2003 to 2014.

Director, Alabama Oral History Project, 2009 to 2011.

Director, Frances S. Summersell Center for the Study of the South, 2006 to 2010

Director of Graduate Studies, University of Alabama, 2003 to 2006.

Assistant Professor, Department of History, University of Alabama, 1999 to 2003.

Assistant Professor, Department of History, University of Central Florida, 1996 to 1999.

Editor, *Florida Historical Quarterly*, 1996 to 1999.

Instructor, Department of History, Columbia College, Columbia, South Carolina.
summer 1996.

Instructor, Department of History and Political Science, South Carolina State
University, Orangeburg, South Carolina, summer 1995.

Instructor, Department of History, Rutgers University, summer 1993 and 1994.

Courses Taught

Graduate:

Teaching History
Proseminar/Seminar: U.S. History Since 1865

Postseminar/Seminar, History of the South
New Left, New Right: U.S. Politics since 1960

Undergraduate:

American Civilization Since 1865
History of the American South, 1607 to the Civil War
History of the American South Since Reconstruction
United States History, 1914-1945
History of Florida to 1865
History of Florida Since 1865
History of Alabama Since 1865
History of the Civil Rights Movement
United States Political History Since 1865
Twentieth-Century American Political Movements
New Left, New Right: U.S. Politics since 1960

Publications

Books

Deep South Dynasty: The Bankheads of Alabama (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2022)

Winner, 2022 Michael V. R. Thomason Award for Best Book in the History of the Gulf South, Gulf South Historical Association

Cold War Dixie: Militarization and Modernization in the American South, 1945-1980 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2013)

Winner, Bennett H. Wall Award for Best Book in Southern Economic and Business History Published Over a Two-Year Period (2014), Southern Historical Association

The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 1932-1968 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

Winner, Harry S. Truman National Book Award for 2002, Harry S. Truman Library Institute

Edited Books

Making Waves: Female Activists in Twentieth Century Florida, co-edited with Jack E. Davis (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003).

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The Modern South, co-edited with Susan Youngblood Ashmore (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press)

Articles and Essays in Edited Collections

"Creating Rural Consumers in the Cold War." in *The Cold War in the American South*, ed. by Amy Sayward and Leah Vallely (Abstract accepted: book under advance contract from University of Alabama Press).

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Review of "Riding the Rails," The American History Project (1997), in *Journal for Multimedia History* Volume 2, 1999.

Review of Bentley Orrick and Harry L. Crumpacker, *The Tampa Tribune: A Century of Florida Journalism* (1998), in *Journal of Southern History* 66 (February 2000), 149.

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Review of David L. Chappell, *Inside Agitators: White Southerners in the Civil Rights Movement* (1994), in *Southern Historian* 17 (1997), 91-93.

Review of Carl Grafton and Anne Permaloff, *Political Power in Alabama: The More Things Change...* (1996), in *The Historian* 60 (Fall 1997), 137-39.

Review of *Georgia in Black and White: Explorations in the Race Relations of a Southern State*, edited by John C. Inscoe (1994), in *Southern Historian*, 99-100.

Review of William Ivy Hair, *The Kingfish and His Realm: The Life and Times of Huey P. Long* (1991), in *Gulf Coast Historical Review* 10 (Spring 1995), 85-86.

Conferences

"The South and the State," Roundtable Discussion of *A New History of the American South* (University of North Carolina Press, 2023), at Louisiana Book Festival, Baton Rouge, October 28, 2023.

Organizer and Participant, "Truman Civil Rights Symposium: A National 75th Anniversary Commemoration," Sponsored by the Truman Library Institute, July 26-28, 2023, Washington DC.

"Finding Upland Bend: The Transformation of a Postwar Southern Community," Alabama Historical Association Annual Meeting, April 14, 2023, Prattville, Alabama.

"Making New Deal Citizens: Middle-Class Values and the Tenant Purchase Program," Gulf South Historical Association Annual Meeting, Gulfport, Mississippi, October 13, 2022.

"Soft Power: Marie Bankhead Owen and the Politics of Race and Class in Alabama," at "Rethinking Alabama Politics from the Civil War to the Present," Symposium at the University of Alabama, October 3, 2022.

"Family Biography as Regional History: The Bankheads of Alabama," A Roundtable Discussion of *Deep South Dynasty*, Alabama Historical Association Annual Meeting, April 8, 2022, Florence, Alabama

Panel Chair, "Memorialization and Resistance on Campus," Southeastern American Studies Association Conference, Birmingham, Alabama, March 3, 2022.

"The Federal Road Aid Act of 1916," Alabama Historical Association Meeting, Auburn, Alabama, April 2017.

Roundtable Participant, "Leading Women: A Roundtable Discussion of Gender and Academic Leadership," Southern Historical Association Conference, Mobile, Alabama, November 3, 2012.

"World War II, Black Political Activity, and White Violence in V.O. Key's Southern Politics," Unlocking V.O. Key, Second Annual Blair Legacy Series Conference, Rockefeller Institute/Diane D. Blair Center for Southern Politics, University of Arkansas, Petit Jean Mountain, Arkansas, April 1-3, 2009.

Commentor, "The 1947 Lynching of Willie Earle: Three Perspectives on South Carolina's Last Known Lynching," Organization of American Historians, Seattle, Washington, March 27, 2009.

Moderator, "The State of Alabama Political History," Alabama Association of Historians, University of West Alabama, Livingston, Alabama, February 6, 2009.

Organizer and Moderator, "Shifting Sands: Changing Images in the 1930s South," Hickory Hill Fall Forum, Watson-Brown Foundation, November 2008.

Organizer, "Race and Place in the American South," University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, April 2007.

"ACE's Wild: The Army Corps of Engineers and Southern Life," Southern Historical Association Conference, Birmingham, Alabama, November 2006.

"Corporate Culture, the Cold War, and the American South," The Military and the American South, 1898 to Present, Watson-Brown Conference, Thomson, Georgia, October 6-7, 2006.

Commentator, "The Rise of the Christian Right," Organization of American Historians, Washington, DC, April 2006.

"The Cold War at the Grass Roots," The End of Southern History? Integrating the Modern South and the Nation, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, March 23-24, 2006.

"Uncle Sam in Dixie: Touring Federal Installations in the American South," International Society of Travel Writing, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, October 2004.

"The Cold War Comes South: A View from the Grassroots," Organization of American Historians, Boston, Massachusetts, March 2004.

"Atomic Spaces in Dixie: Land and Landscape in the Cold War South," Southern Historical Association, Houston, Texas, November 2003.

Commentator, "Alfred Gore Sr. and the Politics of the Modern South," Organization of American Historians, Memphis, Tennessee, April 2003.

"Federal Housing Policy and the Construction of the Savannah River Plant in the 1950s," Organization of American Historians, Washington, DC, April 13, 2002.

"'Displaced Persons' and 'New People': Creating the Savannah River Plant," South Carolina Historical Association, Charleston, South Carolina, March 1, 2002.

"Revolt of the Black Belt: The Dixiecrat Party of 1948," Southern Historical Association, Louisville, Kentucky, November 11, 2000.

Chair, "African American Experiences of Health Care in the South," Southern Association for the History of Medicine and Science, Birmingham, February 18, 2000.

"Southern Labor and Politics: Methodologies, Interpretations, Issues," Southern Labor Studies Conference, Atlanta, Georgia, October 2, 1999.

"Race, Class, and the Willie Earle Lynching: South Carolina, 1947," Southern Historical Association, Birmingham, Alabama, November 12, 1998.

"The Girls' Recreation Center in Orlando and the Origins of an Urban Social Service Network, 1920-1930," Florida Historical Society, Tampa, Florida, May 30, 1998.

"Girls Just Wanna Have Fun: The Girls' Recreation Center in Orlando, 1920-1930," Popular Culture Association, Orlando, Florida, April 10, 1998.

Chair, "Defining Boundaries of Americanism from Hot War to Cold: Race, Gender, Nationalism, and Subversion, 1940-1960," Organization of American Historians, Indianapolis, Indiana, April 4, 1998.

Commentator, "Gender and Sports," Sports and American Culture Lecture Series, University of South Florida, St. Petersburg, Florida, March 30, 1998.

"Class and Confederate Symbolism in the Dixiecrat Movement," Popular Culture Association in the South, Columbia, South Carolina, October 16, 1997.

Commentator, "Race and Education in Late-Nineteenth-Century Florida," Florida Historical Society, Jacksonville, Florida, May 30, 1997.

Commentator, "Women and South Carolina History," South Carolina Historical Association, Columbia, South Carolina, March 8, 1997.

"The Slowest State, the Most Backward Community": Racial Violence in South Carolina and Federal Civil Rights Initiatives," Florida Conference of Historians, Jacksonville, Florida, February 28, 1997.

"Dual Actions, One for Each Race": The Progressive Democrats, the Citizen Democrats, and the Challenge to the Dixiecrats in South Carolina, 1948-1950," Association for the Study of Afro-American Life and History, Charleston, South Carolina, October 3, 1996.

"As a Man, I am Interested in States' Rights": Race, Gender, and the Political Culture of States' Rights, 1948-1950," Organization of American Historians, Chicago, Illinois, March 31, 1996.

"Politicizing the Unprintable: Race, Sex, and Libel in South Carolina Politics, 1949-50," National Association of African American Studies, Virginia State University, St. Petersburg, Virginia, February 17, 1995.

"Reconstituting the Isolationists: Cathrine Curtis and the Mothers' Movement," Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, Bentley College, Waltham, Massachusetts, June 23, 1994.

"Deploying Motherhood: Right-Wing Women and World War II," World War II Conference, Siena College, Loudonville, New York, June 3, 1994.

Invited Lectures

"The Bankheads of Alabama," Museum of Mobile, August 9, 2023, Mobile, Alabama.

"The Bankheads of Alabama," Tuscaloosa Rotary, June 6, 2023, Tuscaloosa, Alabama.

New Book Symposium on *Freedom's Dominion*, by Jefferson Cowie, Crossroads Civic Engagement Center, April 25, 2023, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama.

"The Bankheads of Alabama." Birmingham Historical Society, February 27, 2023. Birmingham, Alabama.

"The Bankheads of Alabama." Alabama Department of Archives and History. Montgomery, Alabama, March 29, 2022.

"The Bankheads of Alabama," Leadership Board Meeting, College of Arts & Sciences, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, March 5, 2022.

"Who are the Bankheads, and Why Should I Care About Them?" OLLIE talk, January 31 2022. Bryant Conference Center, Tuscaloosa, Alabama.

"Family History as Regional Biography: An Overview of Deep South Dynasty," Ernest & Hadley Book Store, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, January 22, 2022.

"Family History as Regional Biography: The Bankheads of Alabama," Jasper Rotary Club, Jasper, Alabama, December 7, 2021.

"How did we Get Here? Some Answers from Alabama's Past," Women's Policy Institute of Birmingham, September 9, 2021.

"200 Years of Alabama History in 45 Minutes," Leadership Alabama, Birmingham, Alabama, January 8, 2021.

"200 Years of Alabama History in 45 Minutes," Blackburn Institute, University of Alabama, August 2020.

"'Better Living'": Life in a Cold War Company Town," National Archives Southeast, Morrow, Georgia, September 2016.

Moderator, "Hidden Humanities" Roundtable Discussion with Professor William Ferris, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, October 6, 2014.

"Finding Women in the Cold War," Pickens-Salley Symposium on Southern Women, University of South Carolina at Aiken, March 25, 2014.

"Better Living': Life in a Cold War Company Town," Up & Atom Breakfast, Employees of Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (formerly Savannah River Site), Aiken, South Carolina, March 26, 2014.

"Cold War Dixie," Savannah River Site Employees (Retired), North Augusta, South Carolina, February 21, 2014.

"The South in the Cold War," Kiwanis of Birmingham, Birmingham, Alabama, November 12, 2013.

"Searching for Political Alternatives in the Great Depression." Harry S Truman Presidential Library. Independence, Missouri. July 22-24, 2009.

"Militarization and Modernization in Aiken, South Carolina, in the 1950s." Up & Atom Breakfast. Citizens for Nuclear Technology Awareness, Aiken, South Carolina, March 14, 2007.

"Atomic Spaces in Dixie." Southern Association for the History of Medicine, Science, and Technology, Augusta, Georgia, February 25, 2005.

"Life on the Nuclear Frontier: The Cold War in South Carolina," South Carolina Historical Symposium, Columbia, South Carolina, February 23, 2005.

"Strom Thurmond and the Biography of Southern Political Change," Continuing Education, University of Alabama, February 2004.

"Strom Thurmond, the Dixiecrat Revolt, and the Origins of the Two-Party South," University of Missouri at Kansas City, Kansas City, Missouri; and the Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Missouri, March 2003.

"Strom Thurmond, the Dixiecrat Revolt, and the Origins of the Two-Party South," University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina, March 26, 2002.

Documentary and Media Appearances

"The Bankheads of Alabama," interview on WKRG-TV (Mobile), August 6, 2023.

"The Cold War in the American South," Modern Scholar Podcast (modernscholarpodcast.com), aired October 2023.

The Blinding of Isaac Woodard, American Experience, PBS, first aired March 30, 2021. On-screen content expert.

Finding the Cornerstone: The Wallace A. Rayfield Story, APTV, aired April 2021. On-screen content expert.

"Walter Edgar's Journal," South Carolina Educational Radio Network, January 2008

"Walter Edgar's Journal," South Carolina Educational Radio Network, March 22, 2002.

Grants, Awards, and Honors

2022	Michael V. R. Thomason Award, Best Book in History of the Gulf South, Gulf South Historical Association
2021-24	Leadership Board Faculty Fellowship, College of Arts & Sciences, University of Alabama
2018	Milo B. Howard Jr. Award, Alabama Historical Association.
2014	Bennett H. Wall Book Award, Southern Historical Association
2009	Academy for Improving Student Success Grant, University of Alabama
2008	Watson-Brown Foundation Contract Grant
2008	Community Based Partnership Grant, University of Alabama

2002	Harry S. Truman National Book Award
2000	National Endowment for the Humanities, Summer Stipend
2000-02	Research Advisory Committee Grant, Office of Sponsored Research, University of Alabama
1997-98	Scholar/Humanist Grant, Florida Humanities Council
1997-98	Dean's Initiative Grant, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Central Florida
1995-96	Louis Bevier Fellowship, Rutgers University
1994-96	Graduate Research Fellowship, Institute for Southern Studies, University of South Carolina
1993-95	Excellence Fellowship, Rutgers University
1994	Dissertation Research Grant, Harry S. Truman Institute

Community Engagement and Outreach

2023	Exhibit Review, Randall Museum at American Village, Montevallo, Alabama
2017-20	Executive Committee, Tuscaloosa Bicentennial Commission
2017-20	Chair, Education Committee, Tuscaloosa Bicentennial Commission Organized "Tuscaloosa Through Time: A Bicentennial History Expo," April 24-27, 2019. Expo featured 29 historical exhibitions from every public and private school in Tuscaloosa. Over 10,000 students attended the exhibit over the course of 3-1/2 days. Managing Editor, <i>200: An Artistic and Literary Celebration</i> (Tuscaloosa, 2019). Includes poems, short stories, and artwork from students representing every school in the city.

Related Professional Experience and Service

Consultant and Participant, "Isaac Woodard, Harry Truman, and Civil Rights," documentary, American Experience, Public Broadcasting Service (March 2021).

Consultant and Participant, "Finding the Cornerstone," documentary, Alabama Public Television (in progress).

Consultant, "Get Right With God," Southern Oral History Collection, University of North Carolina, 2015 to present.

Board of Directors, Harry S. Truman Library Institute, Independence, Missouri, 2019-present.

Grants Committee, Harry S. Truman Library Institute, Independence, Missouri, 2013-present (chair of committee, 2018-present).

Consultant and Participant, "The Bankheads," documentary, Center for Public Broadcasting, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama (2016).

Consultant, "Three Days at Foster," documentary, directed by Keith Dunnivant, Shadowvision Productions, 2013.

Consultant, "The Durrs of Montgomery," documentary, Alabama Public Television, 2012.

Consultant. "Displaced: The Unexpected Fallout from the Cold War." Directed by Mark Albertin. Produced by Scrapbook Video Productions. 2009.

Member, Educational Advisory Committee, Alabama Public Television. 2009-present.

Consultant, National Endowment for the Humanities, Exhibition Grant, University of West Georgia. 2009-present.

Member, Women in the Profession, Southern Historical Association. 2010-2012.

Chair, Lerner-Scott Dissertation Prize, Organization of American Historians. 2008-2009

Member, Southern Industrialization Project, Southern Historical Association Panel. 2007-2008

Member, William F. Holmes Award Committee, Southern Historical Association. 2003

Panelist, National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Stipends Program. 2000-2002, 2004, 2006

Editorial Board, *Florida Historical Quarterly*

Editorial Board, *The Alabama Review*

Editorial Board, *Atlanta History*

Member, State Records Commission, Montgomery, Alabama, 2000-2003

Member, Local Records Commission, Montgomery, Alabama, 2000-2003

Supervisor, Public History Internship Program, University of Alabama, 2001 to present

Supervisor, Public History Internship Program, University of Central Florida, 1997 to 1999

Consultant, Orange County Regional History Center, Maitland County Historical Museum

Manuscript reviewer for Houghton Mifflin, Harcourt Brace, Addison Wesley Longman, ABC-CLIO, New York University Press, University of Alabama Press, University Press of Florida, University of Georgia Press, West Virginia University Press, University of North Carolina Press, University of Missouri Press, Cambridge University Press, Johns Hopkins University Press

Chair, Diversity Committee, University of Alabama

Member, Graduate Council, University of Alabama

Member, Graduate Affairs Committee, University of Alabama

Member, Undergraduate Affairs Committee, University of Alabama

Member, Executive Committee, University of Alabama

Member, Technology and Media Committee, University of Alabama

Member, Faculty Development Committee, University of Alabama

Member, Graduate Affairs Committee, University of Central Florida

Member, University Assessment Committee, University of Central Florida

Member, Teaching Incentive Program Committee, University of Central Florida

Memberships

Organization of American Historians
 Southern Historical Association
 South Carolina Historical Association
 Alabama Historical Association



Exhibit C

Supplemental Report

Dr. Kari Frederickson

July 25, 2024

This supplemental report provides my responses and opinions regarding the June 27, 2024, report submitted by Dr. Adam Carrington.

My concerns about his report can be summarized as follows:

1. He mischaracterizes my argument (and that of much of the scholarship on the political transformation of the South) by stating that I claim the transformation happened quickly and completely. Much of his report is a response to an argument I did not make and which most historians of southern politics do not make.
2. In order to make an argument that downplays the role of race in the post-1965 political landscape, he erases race from Alabama history almost entirely.
3. He makes a number of factual errors as well as errors of omission with regard to Alabama political history. Dr. Carrington is a political scientist whose scholarship focuses on nineteenth century legal history. He is not a recognized scholar of post-Civil War southern or Alabama history.
4. He ignores the political impact of George Wallace, both in the 1968 election and in Alabama political history generally.
5. He identifies a number of factors that he claims explain white voters' turn towards the Republican Party in 1980 and after but ignores the role of race embedded in these issues.

I. Mischaracterization of My Original Argument:

Dr. Carrington sets up his report with a simplistic and inaccurate summary of my report and much of the mainstream of historical scholarship on the issue of political transformation. He writes: "The end of legal segregation and the gains made by the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s caused racially-focused Democrats to abandon the party of Jefferson Davis. They then moved to the Republican camp because the GOP, no longer the party of Lincoln, had adopted the race-conscious, even white-supremacist views once the commitment of the Democratic Party. In short: the two parties switched and Southern whites, unchanged in their views, switched parties in response."¹ He states elsewhere that "[R]ace of course came to the forefront in the 1960s in a

¹ Adam M. Carrington, Report, June 27, 2024, p. 1. Calling the Democratic Party the "party of Jefferson Davis" is peculiar and unnecessarily inflammatory. Certainly historical figures never characterized the party in this fashion, preferring instead to identify Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson as the party's founders. The annual Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner, typically held in early spring, was an annual fundraising event for Democratic Party officials. Davis was indeed a Democrat but had no discernible impact on party ideology. Kari Frederickson, *The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 1932-1968* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 80-81.

way that severely tested the Democratic New Deal coalition [but] did not produce *an immediate move* (emphasis mine) to the Republican Party of any durability.”² Neither I nor the preponderance of scholars of southern politics who look at the issue of race argue that the transition was immediate.³ His report seeks to disprove this faulty premise which, because it is so reductive and simplistic, relieves him of the responsibility of examining the deep historical and cultural complexity of Democratic Party allegiance stretching back to the nineteenth century. The entire transition took decades, although watershed moments, such as the elections of 1964 and 1980, exist. A complete rendering of the transition needs to take into account the political power of southern Democrats in Congress, the differences between southern Democrats and the national Democratic Party, as well as the adoption of key cultural symbols of historic importance by the Republican Party, all of which I address in my original report. In the state of Alabama specifically, this process of Republican resurgence had to grapple with the outsized presence of George Wallace, something Dr. Carrington does not discuss.

His mischaracterization of my argument also involves his careless use of terminology. In particular, he attributes to me the use of the term “white supremacy” or “white supremacist” in a way that is ahistorical and which I do not use in my report beyond a discussion of the Dixiecrat revolt in 1948. As Jason Morgan Ward has argued, overt defense of “white supremacy” per se receded around mid century to be replaced by a defense of segregation, and later by racialized (though not explicitly “white supremacist”) policy positions and politics. To attribute to me the charge that Nixon, for example, was a “white supremacist” or that the post-1964 Republican Party became the party of “white supremacy” grossly misrepresents both my argument and history of racialized political language and policies.⁴

II. Racial Erasure and Errors of Fact

Throughout his report, even when discussing historical points supposedly not in dispute in this case, Dr. Carrington downplays the significance or even the existence of racialized politics altogether. The result is an inaccurate representation of historical events and of the history of the Democratic Party in the South. Removing race from earlier political developments allows him to ignore its role in the political transformation of Alabama and the South in the latter part of the twentieth century.

Allow me to provide a few examples:

Carrington, Report, p. 29.

I address the origins of this slow transition in my book *The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). For support of this argument within the scholarship on southern politics see, among many others, Earl and Merle Black, *Rise of Southern Republicans* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2002); James M. Glaser, *Race, Campaign Politics, and the Realignment in the South* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).

See, for example, Carrington, Report, p. 19; Jason Morgan Ward, *Defending White Democracy: The Making of a Segregationist Movement and the Remaking of Racial Politics, 1936 – 1965* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011).

The Republican Party During Reconstruction and in the Later Nineteenth Century: About this incredibly contentious and revolutionary moment in American history, Dr. Carrington writes that “*Some attempts* (emphasis mine) were made during Reconstruction to make the GOP competitive in the South but such efforts failed, especially once federal troops were withdrawn.”⁵ First, the wording of this is peculiar. Characterizing the creation of the biracial Republican coalitions in the southern states as merely “some attempts” mischaracterizes the extent of as well as the revolutionary nature of the Republican party’s biracial coalition of freedmen, white southerners, and white newcomers in Alabama and across the South. Republicans – Black and white – were elected to local, state, and national offices. This coalition was responsible for repealing the onerous Black Codes and for ratifying the 14th and 15th amendments. Although they never dominated the Republican Party, Black Republicans continued to be elected to public office in the 1880s and 1890s.⁶ The “attempts” actually were quite successful. Second, Dr. Carrington’s representation of the connection between federal troops and Republican Party viability is misleading, implying that Republican viability was only possible with federal protection. The truth is that the number of federal troops in the South during Reconstruction was never sufficient to keep domestic order. White and Black Republicans participated in politics at great physical peril at all times, even while the region was under Union occupation. Republican Party coalitions were regarded by white Democrats as illegitimate from the moment they were created. Most historians would argue that the failure of the Republican Party – a biracial coalition – to remain competitive was due to unrelenting violence from white Democrats – violence that occurred while US troops remained in the South. Dr. Carrington’s interpretation downplays Black political agency, the existence of biracial political coalitions, and the relentless use of white terror that cast a long shadow over Alabama and southern politics.⁷

Dr. Carrington further chalks up the lack of Republican inroads in the South in the latter part of the nineteenth century to the region’s traditional culture, agricultural economy, and the fact that [white] southerners were “embittered by the memory of the Civil War.”⁸ This simply is incorrect. Most, but not all, white southerners despised the Republican Party because of the revolutionary changes wrought by Reconstruction as well as continued Republican Party support for voting rights protection such as that offered by the Federal Elections Bill of 1890, also known as the Lodge Bill. As the national party turned its focus to economic matters such as tariffs and to the

⁵ Carrington, Report, p. 8.

⁶ Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Civil War* (New York: HarperCollins, 1988); Steven Hahn, *A Nation Under our Feet: Black Political Struggles in the Rural South from Slavery to the Great Migration* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2003); *Black Americans in Congress, 1870 – 2007* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2008).

⁷ For white violence in Alabama during Reconstruction and the political aftermath, see Jefferson Cowie, *Freedom’s Dominion: A Saga of White Resistance to Federal Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2022), chapters 9 and 10. For white violence during Reconstruction elsewhere in the South, see Stephen V. Ash, *A Massacre in Memphis: The Race Riot That Shook the Nation One Year After the Civil War* (New York: Hill & Wang, 2013); LeeAnn Keith, *The Colfax Massacre: The Untold Story of Black Power, White Terror, and the Death of Reconstruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); and Richard Zuczek, *State of Rebellion: Reconstruction in South Carolina* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2009).

⁸ Carrington, Report, p.24.

concerns of industrial America. It all but abandoned its earlier determination to protect the rights of Black southern voters.⁹

The Progressive Era Dr. Carrington incorrectly states that the Progressive Movement made “little inroads in its southern portion.”¹⁰ This statement is simply wrong and demonstrates not only a lack of understanding of Alabama politics and social movements, but also again serves as a thinly veiled attempt to erase race from Alabama politics entirely. The racial disfranchisement campaigns in Alabama and across the South were promoted as a type of Progressive reform. With Black men removed from the electorate, white men were free from the necessity to commit fraud and could safely disagree on the issues without worrying about who controlled the so-called “negro block vote.”¹¹ Two of the most consequential pieces of legislation passed by Congress during what is identified as the Progressive Era – the Clayton Anti-Trust Act and the Federal Road Aid Act (until the New Deal, this program resulted in the greatest transfer of federal dollars to the states) -- were authored by Congressman Henry Clayton and Senator John Bankhead respectively, both from Alabama. Alabama congressman Richmond Hobson was a leading voice on prohibition and fought long and hard for what eventually became the 18th Amendment.¹² This movement had strong support among the state’s Black and white citizens, particularly evangelical Christians. The most significant Progressive Era reform, the passage of the 19th Amendment, though not ratified by the Alabama state legislature, received strong support from Hobson who by that time was out of office. Although Alabama suffragists fought hard for ratification, they were no match for the Anti-Suffragists, who lobbied state legislators and warned that ratification of the amendment would open the voting booth to Black women and thus serve as a backdoor assault on white supremacy.¹³

Alabama was a site of fervent Progressive reform. Many of the social and political reforms undertaken were driven or warped by the desire to maintain white supremacy, but they were considered “progressive” nevertheless.

New Deal Coalition Dr. Carrington’s incomplete description of the New Deal coalition and how it functioned likewise ignores racial complexity and plants the seeds for his later class-based explanation for why the Democratic Party fractured in the late 1960s. He is correct in pointing out that by the mid 1930s, the Democratic Party became a broad coalition in which southern white Democrats and African Americans (where they could access the vote) participated, and that New Deal policies were primarily economic in focus. These two groups were far from equal partners in this coalition, however. Southern Democrats in Congress had a significant hand in the design and passage of New Deal programs. As a result of southern political power, Blacks

For the national Republican Party’s abandonment of Black voters in the South, see Michael Perman, *Struggle for Mastery: Disfranchisement in the South, 1888-1898* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

⁹ Carrington, Report, p. 24.

¹⁰ R. Volney Riser, *Defying Disfranchisement: Black Voting Rights Activism in the Jim Crow South, 1890-1908* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2010); William A. Link, *The Paradox of Southern Progressivism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992).

¹¹ Karl Frederickson, *Deep South Dynasty: The Bankheads of Alabama* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2022), Chapter 6. Hobson was the first congressman to introduce the amendment, which he did in 1911.

¹² Eliza C. Green, *Southern Strategies: Southern Women and the Woman Suffrage Question* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 107-9.

received fewer benefits than whites (especially from programs administered at the local level) and were often left out of certain programs and protections altogether. Many popular New Deal reforms and programs were firmly locked within what political scientist Ira Katznelson calls the "southern cage." The greatest beneficiaries of the New Deal were working class whites. The national Democratic Party's willingness to accept racial discrimination in New Deal programs and legislation was essential for keeping this coalition together in the 1930s and 1940s.¹⁴ Why would African Americans (those who could vote) support a president and a party that so clearly was discriminatory in its programs? Black voters have never been able to afford the luxury of ideological purity (if they wanted to exercise their citizenship rights), so pragmatism was the order the day. What Black Americans received from the New Deal, however limited, was far more than they had received from any Republican administration since Reconstruction.

These three examples contradict Dr. Carrington's dismissal of the role of race in critical moments in southern and Alabama history, as well as his general lack of understanding of Alabama history.

III. Cracks in the Democratic Party Coalition: The Role of George Wallace

Unwilling to see race anywhere in southern politics, Dr. Carrington carries this interpretation forward in attempting to explain post-1964 political change, starting with the 1968 election and changes within the Democratic Party coalition. He credits a relatively small, fractious group of left-wing intellectuals for fomenting the 1968 fracture. Dr. Carrington argues that these intellectuals drove working-class white voters out of the Democratic Party beginning in 1968 by accusing them of racism and equating them with oppressors. This interpretation simply is not supported by the facts, nor by the scholarship. Organized labor – the loudest voice of the working class, with its strong anticommunist bent and support for continuation of Lyndon Johnson's policy in Vietnam – remained the most powerful member of the Democratic Party coalition; the notion that labor in 1968 was cowed by a rag-tag group of leftwing intellectuals is false. Democratic Party nominee Hubert Humphrey had a strong voting record on labor issues, as did the 1972 nominee, Senator George McGovern. Any conflict between the Democratic Party nominees and white working-class voters was not based on any lack of support for working-class issues.

The biggest electoral challenge in 1968 to the Democratic Party coalition came from George Wallace, candidate of the American Independent Party, not from left-wing intellectuals. Wallace peeled off racially conservative southern voters and won five southern states in 1968, states that quite possibly would have gone to Republican candidate Richard Nixon. Just as important, though, Wallace's appeal reached beyond the South to white working-class constituencies in the Midwest. Organized labor's last-minute campaigning for Humphrey clawed back much of that early support by illustrating Wallace's poor record on labor issues.¹⁵ Wallace's appeals to white working-class grievance – both racial and to a lesser degree opposition to perceived elitism of

¹⁴ For the role of southern lawmakers in the crafting of New Deal legislation, see Ira Katznelson, *Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time* (New York: Liveright, 2013); and Frederickson, *Deep South Dynasty*, chapters 9-11.

¹⁵ Luke Nichter, *The Year that Broke Politics: Collusion and Chaos in the Presidential Election of 1968* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2023).

anti-war protestors – helped further the transition of many white voters (North and South) away from the Democratic Party in presidential elections. Although the numerous groups that made up the New Left coalition would eventually help shape the Democratic Party agenda after 1968, the first major fracture with electoral impact at the presidential level came about as a result of civil rights legislation and George Wallace's third-party candidacy.

George Wallace was the most consequential politician in Alabama in the second half of the twentieth century. His impact resonated beyond this single state and had a profound impact on politics in the latter half of the twentieth century.¹⁶ His 1968 presidential run, though not successful, introduced the rhetoric of anti-elitism and hostility to federal power (mostly as it applied to school integration and fair housing legislation) as the new language of racial grievance, a rhetoric that was adopted by conservative politicians across the country. Wallace dominated Alabama politics for roughly three decades, and any attempt to discuss the history of political parties in the state and region must take his influence into account. With the exception of a few mentions specifically tied to the 1968 election, George Wallace appears nowhere in Dr. Carrington's report.

IV. Economic, Cultural, and Foreign Policy Issues and their Role in the Growth of the Republican Party in the South

Dr. Carrington holds that white southern voters gravitated to the Republican Party because of its position on economic and cultural/religious issues, as well as the staunch anticommunist foreign policy positions of Republican candidates. His discussion of the impact of free trade ideology, strident anticommunism (as enunciated by Republican candidate-then-president Ronald Reagan), and the role of politicized evangelicals at times is inaccurate and lacks evidence.

I. Anticommunism:

His analysis of white southerners' staunch anticommunism as a reason for their Republican Party allegiance is superficial, narrowly defined, and without grounding in critical historical events. He argues that anticommunism exists only in the very limited space of international Cold War fears, and that anticommunism as a position applies strictly to foreign policy. He grounds white southerners' anticommunism in their religiosity but very quickly dismisses the long history of the linkage between race and anticommunism -- a history that stretches back to 1919. This linkage and its long, tortured history are fundamental to an understanding of how white southerners understood the term "anticommunism."¹⁷

White southerners declared any challenge to the social order -- particularly, but not exclusively, the campaign for civil rights and protections for labor -- as "communist." A history exists of communists fighting for racial equality and workers' rights in Alabama. In the 1930s, the

¹⁶ Dan T. Carter, *The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995); Dan T. Carter, *From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the Conservative Counterrevolution* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1999).

¹⁷ See Timothy Tyson, *Radio Free Dixie: Robert F. Williams and the Roots of Black Power* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); George Lewis, *The White South and the Red Menace: Segregation, Anticommunism, and Massive Resistance* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004).

Communist Party organized Black sharecroppers into a union and staged strikes on thirty-five plantations across seven Black Belt counties in 1935. Although concessions were won in several counties, ultimately the strike and the union were destroyed by violence from landowners and law enforcement.¹⁸ More famously, lawyers with the Communist Party's International Defense Fund defended the *Scotsboro Boys* -- nine Black teenagers wrongfully accused of raping two white women. This incident of racial injustice received international attention. That communists would provide a legal defense for Black teenagers accused of the most heinous (in the eyes of white southerners) of crimes -- interracial rape -- cemented their place as one of the greatest threats to the southern social order.¹⁹ From the 1930s forward, then, the term "communist" was associated with any entity that appeared to threaten the region's racial or industrial status quo. At times, that entity was the federal government, the civil rights movement, the labor movement, or even the Supreme Court. So when Republican politicians such as Ronald Reagan promoted themselves as staunch anticommunists, that position had a historical resonance for white southerners that was grounded in ideas about race.

The conflation of communism with "anything that threatens the conservative social order" continues to this day. Within the past year, U.S. Senator from Alabama Tommy Tuberville grounded his fight to put a hold on military promotions until the military changed its policy regarding access to reproductive care for female servicemembers in the notion that providing abortion access to female soldiers was "communistic."²⁰ The senator's use of the term is completely divorced from any foreign policy position but rather is tied to his conservative social and cultural views. This conflation has a long history that Dr. Carrington conveniently ignores but which has powerful meaning nevertheless.

2. The Role of Class and Reagan's Economic Policy

Dr. Carrington argues that the Republican Party's economic philosophy (especially as introduced and articulated by Republican president Ronald Reagan) was the primary force behind white southerners' migration to the Republican Party. He argues that Reagan's free market orientation and tax cuts fostered economic growth, in particular white-collar jobs in southern metropolitan and suburban areas. This growth, he holds, fueled the Republican Party's resurgence in the South.

Unfortunately, he does not provide any evidence from Alabama as to how Reagan's policies were received, or any evidence as to how his policies drove growth and thus political change. What we do know is that southern members of Congress were lukewarm towards Reagan's free-market ideology and possessed a decidedly different economic perspective than did the Republican president. Despite generations of overt antagonism towards federal power, southern leaders were prepared to scale back government only when it did not have a negative impact on important regional industries. Southern lawmakers were hostile to Reagan's attack on price supports for farmers, and white rural voters recoiled at the president's attack on rural electric cooperatives.

¹⁸ Robin D. G. Kelley, *Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists During the Great Depression* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1990).

¹⁹ James Goodman, *Stories of Scotsboro* (New York: Pantheon, 1994).

²⁰ <https://www.msn.com/en-us/video/health/tuberville-on-military/vi-AA1ijEVu>

Ultimately, agricultural interests rejected and defeated Reagan's free-market ideology by maintaining supports programs for key southern commodities, severely inhibiting Reagan's plan for a free market in agriculture. Free trade was also detrimental to the textile industry, which by 1980 was the largest industrial employer in Alabama. The industry was struggling against cheaper imports from Asia. Although Reagan initially promised to protect textiles (contradicting his own policy), he reneged, refusing to sign a bill protecting the industry, much to the chagrin of Republican Senator Jeremiah Denton and others. Alabama lawmakers were more in line with Reagan's plan to cut social spending and, to a lesser degree, to cut taxes.²¹

As far as metropolitan growth goes, Birmingham and Huntsville seem to contradict Dr. Carrington's argument that such growth was tied in with Reagan's anti-statist free market ideology. Economic growth in Huntsville was driven by defense spending and access to cheap TVA power. In Birmingham, economic vitality was linked to the University of Alabama at Birmingham. In addition, long-term, concerted efforts by numerous stakeholders in those communities to attract businesses through multi-pronged economic recruitment strategies contributed mightily to their growth.²²

3. Religiosity, Abortion, and Sexuality

Dr. Carrington argues that white southerners' religious beliefs, expressed politically in their opposition to abortion and to LGBTQ+ rights, likewise drove white southern voters toward the Republican Party, whose stance on those issues they found more congenial. He further states that these issues are wholly divorced from race. His framing of these issues and their adoption by the Republican Party again ignores the role of race. He also disregards the role played by the women's liberation movement. Race occupies a prominent place in the history of southern white evangelical Christians and their particular worldview; furthermore, prominent Christian leaders and politicians who opposed abortion and gay rights, like Jerry Falwell Sr., founder of the organization Moral Majority, and Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, had sustained records of opposing civil rights advances (e.g. slow-walking desegregation at the University of North Carolina and Bob Jones University's fight to maintain racially discriminatory practices). The connection to race is found in the broader conversation regarding rights, specifically the rights demanded by women and the rights demanded by LGBTQ+ individuals. The connection to race lies not only in the actions of individuals like Falwell and Helms, but in white evangelicals' particular conceptual world.

Historian Glenn Feldman, one of the foremost experts on the history of Alabama politics in the twentieth century, notes that "politics, morality, and race...have a long history of interconnectedness and overlap in southern mind, manners, and sensibilities – an indelible

²¹ Jonathan Barthor, *Whistling Dixie: Ronald Reagan, the White South, and the Transformation of the Republican Party* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2024).

²² Matthew L. Downs, *Transforming the South: Federal Development in the Tennessee Valley, 1915-1960* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2014); Wayne Flynt, *Alabama in the Twentieth Century* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2004), 164-65.

relationship that resonates strongly into the present.”²³ The practice of racial segregation was supported by southern religious leaders and laypeople. According to historian Fred Bailey, southern Baptists and other white clergy “gave the sanction of religion to a society in which white men of substance were born to rule, lesser whites to follow, and blacks to obey.” The relegation of Blacks to an inferior social status was required in “a virtuous Christian society.”²⁴ This imagined virtuous Christian society was a patriarchal one of order based on rigid and interlocking racial and gender hierarchies in which white women and all Black people were subservient to white men.

The Civil Rights Movement profoundly threatened the southern social order, and white evangelicals marshalled religion in defense of segregation as the movement accelerated. In Alabama specifically, site of critical victories for the cause of racial equality, ministers and laypeople invoked religion in defense of racial segregation. Historian Paul Harvey writes that ministers such as Henry L. Lyon of Birmingham “defended segregation as positively God-ordained. In ‘Why Racial Integration is UnChristian,’ an address he delivered often, he argued that ‘separation of the races is the commandment and law of God.’”²⁵ The *Alabama Baptist* printed the opinion of the Reverend J.M. Drummond, who claimed that “integration is nothing but Communism, and it is strictly against God’s Holy Word.”²⁶

Ultimately, white southerners lost the fight to maintain segregation. But the anger of conservative evangelicals with the relatively moderate position on desegregation enunciated by their national organizations led conservatives to organize. Beginning in the 1970s, conservatives in the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) staged a rout of moderates and assumed control over the convention’s numerous agencies and its significant budget.²⁷

Conservative Christians found their next fight in the expanding women’s liberation movement, which involved not only the right to terminate a pregnancy but also the fight for the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). Anti-feminists, especially those who considered themselves part of the Christian Right, labeled ERA supporters and pro-choice activists as anti-family and worse. Dr. Carrington ignores the role of the expanding women’s liberation movement and the reactionary anti-feminism that sought to thwart it as key elements in the Republican Party’s agenda beginning in 1980. Just as the women’s liberation movement (and the broader rights revolution) drew strength and momentum from the Civil Rights Movement, the expanding rights terrain precipitated a shift in focus for religious conservatives, who recoiled at the challenges feminists posed to traditional gender roles.²⁸ Religious conservatives lost much of the traditional

²³ Glenn Feldman, ed., *Politics and Religion in the White South* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2005), 3.

²⁴ Fred Bailey, “That Which God Hath Put Asunder: White Baptists, Black Aliens, and the Southern Social Order, 1890-1920,” in Feldman, ed., *Politics and Religion in the White South*, 12, 27.

²⁵ Paul Harvey, “Religion, Race, and the Right in the South, 1945-1990,” in Feldman, ed., *Politics and Religion in the White South*, 106.

²⁶ Mark Newman, *Getting Right with God: Southern Baptists and Desegregation, 1945-1999* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2001), 58.

²⁷ Harvey, “Religion, Race, and the Right in the South,” 101.


²⁸ Robert Self, *All in the Family: Realignment of American Democracy Since the 1960s* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2012).

ideological undergirding for their race politics, but they found new inspiration in the defense of traditional gender roles. In the process, the conservatives jettisoned the familiar arguments for racial hierarchy, replacing these now-discredited views with a renewed and updated defense of gendered hierarchies. This rejection of feminism and reproductive choice was embraced by the Republican Party beginning in the 1980s.

Summary

Racial politics has a long history in the United States, the American South, and in Alabama. For the first half of the twentieth century, the Democratic Party's dominance in the one-party South was dependent on its defense of white supremacy. White voters' allegiance to the Democratic Party was deeply engrained in southern culture, and breaking that allegiance took time. For much of the twentieth century, the Republican Party in the South was not competitive; the Great Depression relegated the Republican Party nationally to minority status. My original report argued that, in order to become competitive, the Republican Party made a deliberate decision to court southern white voters, both through its policy positions and through its adoption of historical cultural symbols. This decision paid off to the point where the party's continued growth relied on winning white majorities in the southern states. In Alabama, the political parties are racially polarized. While the overt racism of the past no longer animates Alabama politics, I agree with political scientist David A. Hughes, who writes that "the politics of race...are never far from the surface."²⁹

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 25th day of July 2024, Tuscaloosa, Alabama.



Kari Frederickson, Ph.D.

²⁹ David A. Hughes, "Alabama: Polarized and Uncompetitive," in Charles S. Bullock and Mark Rozell, eds., *The New Politics of the Old South: An Introduction to Southern Politics* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2021), 84.



Milligan v. Allen

Caster v. Allen

Singleton v. Allen

N.D. Alabama

Expert Report of Adam M. Carrington, Ph.D.

June 27, 2024

Qualifications

I am an Associate Professor of Politics at Hillsdale College where I have taught since 2014. I received my M.A. and Ph.D. from Baylor University in that same year. At Hillsdale, I hold the William and Patricia LaMothe Chair in the U.S. Constitution. I also hold an appointment and teach regularly in the Van Andel Graduate School of Statesmanship at Hillsdale. My scholarship has focused on American political institutions in their historical context, including the judiciary, the presidency, and political parties. I have published work concerning these topics focused on the American South as well. Along these lines, I have had scholarly articles published on Southern judicial history in *Southern Legal History* and *Journal of American Legal History*.¹ These pieces focused on the Reconstruction Era. I also have an article on Congressional attempts to curb the Supreme Court through proposing Constitutional amendments, which links those efforts to changing political party dynamics in the latter half of the 20th century.² Moreover, I have taught courses on political parties, the presidency, the U.S. Constitution, and Constitutional law throughout my time at Hillsdale College.

For my work on this report, I was compensated at the rate of \$300 an hour. I was not directed to come to any particular result but to submit my findings based on my own research and conclusions.

Findings and Conclusions

In this report, I analyze the historical development of party affiliations among Alabama voters from comprising the core of the Democratic “Solid South” to becoming a dependably Republican-voting state. I give special focus to the shifting patterns of Southern white voters from reliably Democrat to dependably Republican. This development will reach back to the 1920s, though particular attention will be given to the region’s and state’s histories since the 1950s.

As I will recount, many explain the historical partisan shift with a decided if not entire focus on race: The end of legal segregation and the gains made by the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s caused racially-focused Democrats to abandon the party of Jefferson Davis. They then moved to the Republican camp because the GOP, no longer the party of Lincoln, had adopted the race-conscious, even white-supremacist views once the commitment of the Democratic Party. In short: the two parties switched and Southern whites, unchanged in their views, switched parties in response.

¹ Adam M. Carrington, “Running the Robed Gauntlet: Southern State Courts’ Interpretation of the Emancipation Proclamation” *Journal of American Legal History* 57(4)(December 2017): 556-584; Adam M. Carrington, “Equality, Prejudice, and the Rule of Law: Alabama Supreme Court Justice Thomas M. Peters’ Protection of African-American Rights During Reconstruction” *Journal of Southern Legal History* 25(2017): 205-234.

² See Curt Nichols, David Bridge, and Adam M. Carrington, “Court Curbing via Attempt to Amend the Constitution” *Justice Systems Journal* 35(4)(2014): 331-343.

So the story goes. But I will discuss how this focus fails to tell the full tale. A singular or even dominant focus on race is insufficient in explaining the development of the current partisan landscape in the broader American South generally and in Alabama specifically. This report will seek to give a fuller picture of the development of political parties in the 20th century and into the 21st century that describes other, crucial factors that contributed to the partisan shift in the South from Democrat to Republican.

First, I will set up the concept of American political parties, examining how the history and scholarship regarding them points toward parties as voter coalitions with significant fluidity. Voters in most cases are not defined by one issue or identity in their electoral choices. Second, I apply this theory to Southern partisan voting patterns since the 1920s, with special attention paid to the post-1950 history. In that examination, I do note how pervasive the issue of race was during the post-Civil War and early 20th century periods. However, as other scholars argue, too, I will describe how the post-Civil Rights era marked the South's transition toward acting more in line with the scholarly theories of parties and thus closer to the rest of the country. Historically, this story moves from the New Deal Democratic Coalition to the rise of the New Left within the Democratic Party and the rise of Modern Conservatism within the Republican Party. Those developments in the parties in the 1950s and 1960s inaugurated a slow but definite partisan shift. On a host of non-racial issues—economic, foreign policy, and social—Democrats moved away from the preferences of a majority of Southern voters, making the Republican Party, especially its Modern Conservative element, more attractive. Moreover, the South itself evolved in ways that aligned it more naturally with the GOP, especially on economic policy.

This analysis is relevant to the totality of circumstances test required by §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Specifically, it appears to touch on the issue of redistricting in relation to at least three of the factors put forth by the Senate Judiciary Committee in its 1982 amendment of §2. The first Senate factor considers the “extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process.” While not focused on particular laws, executive orders, or like public policy actions (though some will receive direct attention), this report will discuss the matters that precede and often underly government action. Government actions result from those holding office who obtain those offices either directly or indirectly by elections. Election results stem from the actions of voters taken in relation to their political views. These views closely relate to the political parties and other coalitions with which they align. Understanding the significant roles played by issues other than race in Southern and Alabama party affiliations can help to understand whether racial discrimination features in Alabama's political processes.

This report also comments on redistricting in relation to the second factor, which concerns the “extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized.” By this factor, I understand polarization to involve more than simply the question of whether whites and blacks generally vote for different political parties and candidates. That African-American and white voters tend to vote more for Democrats or Republicans nationally, regionally, and in Alabama particularly is largely true. However, just because racial polarization might technically or statistically exist does not mean that it *substantively* exists. Statistical racial polarization in itself reveals nothing about the motivations underlying voter behavior. I understand substantive racial polarization to mean that race, rather than other factors like political partisanship, predominantly explain voting patterns. My report will give evidence that partisanship fueled by political issues not directly tied to nor driven by racial

views better explains the statistical racial polarization seen in Alabama. In other words, the evidence suggests that party politics, not race, explains why Alabama voters vote the way they do.

Finally, this report bears on the sixth factor, which confronts the question of whether or not, “political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals.”³ While some attention will be paid to particular comments made by public persons, this report will focus on the deeper and broader coalitional developments among Southern voters that have helped shift the South, including Alabama, from reliably Democratic in voting patterns to generally Republican. These developments will examine a combination of policies, platforms, and public perceptions related to the two major political parties. Here, the report will contend, again, that the appeals that have effectively shifted partisan leanings in the South include appeals to economic, foreign policy, and social issues not focused on race.

Ultimately, the broader story of the partisan shift in the South, including Alabama, speaks to race as not the exclusive or even dominant factor in enduring voting changes. Instead, the success of the Civil Rights Movement helped in the ability for other political matters to come to prominence. Those other matters then took on a significant role in the partisan changes among Southern voters, including voters in Alabama.

Methodology

I have taken an approach that is both theoretical and historical. I begin with theory, discussing the concept of political parties in the scholarly literature. I then turn to history, using the theory as a lens through which to see the historical development of parties with a special comparative focus on the South. My focus will predominately be on Southern white voters, whose shift in voting tendencies formed the main statistical reason for the change in expected partisan election results. My analysis also will tend to focus on the South generally and the Deep South in particular, though specific instances and data related to Alabama will be noted. In this approach, I agree with the general scholarly view that Alabama is not an outlier within the Deep South in significant ways on the issues this report addresses.⁴

To construct this analysis, I draw heavily on historical scholarship and also draw on primary documents such as speeches at national conventions, party platforms, national legislation, presidential executive orders, and state ballot initiatives. Given the party and coalitional lens, prominence will be given to party-related documents.

The Nature of American Political Parties

In 1942, E.E. Schattschneider wrote that “democracy is unthinkable save in terms of [political] parties.”⁵ Historically, political parties have formed the basic structure by which Americans organize themselves around principle and policy commitments. In this light, they structure their choices for public offices — national, state, and local. Political parties also aid in the functioning of government, providing

³ United States Senate, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, Report No. 97-417, 28-29.

⁴ Placing Alabama as a generally typical state within the Deep South is longstanding. See Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, *Negroes and the New Southern Politics* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1966); Seth C. McKee and Melanie J. Springer, “A Tale of ‘Two Souths’” *Social Science Quarterly* 96(2)(June 2015): 588-607.

⁵ E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government: American Government in Action* (New York: Routledge, 2003[1942]), 1.

an institution and an identity that facilitates cooperation between Constitutional offices such as the House and the Senate, Congress and the President, as well as state and national governments.⁶

John Aldrich, in his 1995 work, *Why Parties?*, points up that, “[a]ll democracies that are Madisonian, extended republics, which is to say all democratic nations, have political parties.”⁷ By speaking of James Madison and an extended republic, Aldrich grounds the study of American political parties in that Framer’s possibly most famous written work, *Federalist 10*.

In 1787-1788, the Anti-Federalists who opposed ratification of the then-proposed Constitution argued that America already was too large to operate as a functioning republic. Taking a cue from the French philosopher Montesquieu, these Anti-Federalists argued that republics must be small in size. When they grew too large, they morphed into empire and went from a government of, by, and for the people into a despotism either of one person or of a few elites. *Brutus*, one of the leading Anti-Federalists, made this argument in his first paper critiquing the proposed constitution. He wrote “that a free republic cannot succeed over a country of such immense extent, containing such a high number of inhabitants...as that of the whole United States.”⁸ He recounted how the republics of ancient Greece and Rome, having “extended their conquests over large territories of country” that “the consequence was, that their governments were changed from that of free governments to those of the most tyrannical that ever existed in the world.”⁹

In *Federalist 10*, James Madison responded to this and like critiques as part of a broader argument to ratify the Constitution. He did so first by bringing up a different problem that plagued popular governments. This problem was so dangerous it proved to have “been the mortal diseases under which popular governments everywhere have perished.”¹⁰ This hideous monster he called faction. It consisted of either “a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”¹¹ These factions were driven not by cool, thoughtful reflection on the common good but by impulsive, emotional prejudices to oppress others or to do some other kind of public harm. Factions caused instability and injustice to seize the political process, often sending the republic in a tumultuous pendulum swinging between anarchy and tyranny, ending in the regime’s demise.

By his own account, Madison’s most important solution for the problem of faction was an extended or large republic—the very set-up the Anti-Federalists feared. However, Madison argued that an extended or large republic would contain significant advantages over a small one in addressing faction’s pernicious effects. Small republics tended to have a very homogenous population with super-majorities sharing a wide swath of characteristics, principles, and policy positions. This homogeneity allowed for majority factions to organize and to act on their disordered, oppressive injustice with relative ease.

⁶ See Harry V. Jaffa, *A New Birth of Freedom: Abraham Lincoln and the Coming of the Civil War* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 434.

⁷ John H. Aldrich, *Why Parties?: The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 3.

⁸ *Brutus*, “No. 1,” *The Anti-Federalist*, edited by Hebert J. Storing, Selected by Murray Dry from *The Complete Anti-Federalist* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985[1981]), 113.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 42.

¹¹ *Publius* (Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay), *The Federalist, Gideon Edition* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), 43.

A large republic countered this problem. It did so by subverting factions' ability to organize and to act as majorities. The logic was fairly common-sense. A large republic meant more people involved in politics across a wider expanse of territory. Usually, that enlarging of the population introduced much greater diversity within the people regarding their characteristics, their principles, and their preferences. Doing so undermined the ability of homogenous majorities to realize their existence and organize politically around it. Even more important, though, this diversity then restricted if not eliminated the existence of broad and deep majorities in the first place.

This heterogeneous population held two important ramifications for this report's purposes. First, majorities usually needed to be created by means of forming coalitions. In other words, persons not exactly alike must agree to work together to reach the needed vote threshold to win elections. On religion, for example, no one sect tended to garner over 50% of the vote. Thus, Baptists might need to make common cause with Lutherans or Presbyterians or Roman Catholics or other faiths (or no faith) to achieve the majority needed to enact principles and policies. Doing so tended to keep the majorities from agreeing to the plans of oppressive factions. Instead, they had to find common ground more on basic human rights and the common good of the general public.

Second, the coalitional nature of majorities made those majorities much more fragile and fluid than they would be in a small republic with a largely homogeneous population. Persons or groups did not tend to have only one issue that drove them. Various matters could ignite their interest and influence their vote at the same or at different times. Thus, these persons or groups may unite on one issue or set of issues but not on others. Views on taxes or foreign policy might be the main point holding the coalition together, for instance. But if other issues became primary, ones on which the coalition did not agree, they could split the coalition and make way for new majorities formed by other primary points of agreement.

As Aldrich implied, much of the modern political science literature on American political parties traces its theory, whether consciously or not, back to Madison's observations in *Federalist 10*. For political parties are seeking majorities in the House, Senate, state legislatures, governorships, and in the Electoral College that selects the president. Given our extended (and ever more extending) republic, competitive American political parties must be coalitional. They cannot rely on one region, one subgroup, or one issue to win and maintain majorities. Thus, parties act like coalitions as described above. They form around basic like characteristics and on agreement regarding a set of issues. In fact, recent party literature has focused on the claim that, "groups of organized policy demanders are the basic units of our theory of parties."¹² Therefore, parties consist of "coalitions of interest groups and activists seeking to capture and use government for their particular goals."¹³ The party usually tries to focus its stances on issues that accentuate its unity. However, new issues arise and secondary matters become primary. Parties, then, whether as a whole or in regard to particular members, may be forced to take other stances that threatens to undermine its unity.¹⁴ The 19th century Whig Party, for example, formed around common views about internal improvements and tariffs (known as the "American System"), legislative supremacy within the elected branches of government, and opposition to President

¹² Kathleen Bawn, Martin Cohen, David Karol, Seth Maskett, Hans Noel, and Johnny Zaller, "A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics" *Perspectives on Politics* 10(3)(August 2012): 575.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 571.

¹⁴ Gary Miller and Norman Schofield, "The Transformation of the Republican and Democratic Party Coalitions in the U.S." *Perspectives on Politics* 6(3)(2008): 433.

Andrew Jackson. Yet in the 1850s, the party was ripped into pieces and ceased to exist when slavery, an issue it tried to relegate to secondary status, rose to a place where it no longer could be avoided.¹⁵

This background brings us to the focus of this report. In discussing voting patterns and coalitional arrangements in the South, including Alabama, race has been exalted as the dominant factor influencing voters up to the present.¹⁶ And race did play an out-sized part through a significant portion of Southern political history. In fact, this matter showed the explanatory limits of the extended republic as Madison described it in *Federalist 10*. Sometimes, though rarely, one issue or identity could overwhelm the others. In this instance, race and its institutionalization in slavery or, later, in segregation, overwhelmed other factors that might have undermined this majority faction and created fluid coalitions. Economic class, for instance, did not have the explanatory power that *Federalist 10* and other theories held for it in defining party alignments and developments.¹⁷ A 1958 article noted, “[t]he emphasis on unity among the ‘whites’ in the south’s one-party system de-emphasizes class differences or issues involving conflict within the white group.”¹⁸ Glen Feldmen observed the longstanding tendency “to put race regularity and white supremacy above all other competing factors.”¹⁹ Moreover, the predominance of race and slavery over all other issues in the 1850s helped lead to the American Civil War. The issue of race was perpetuated by voter suppression and Jim Crow segregation in the post-Reconstruction South as well. There was some white dissent in the South even during these periods, especially in the mountain regions of Eastern Tennessee and Western North Carolina that had opposed secession and, post-war, clung to Republican Party loyalty, despite finding little statewide electoral success.²⁰ But these were exceptions, not the rule. Therefore, the preceding points must be seen and acknowledged as deeply influential on Southern politics in the 19th and early to mid-20th centuries.

Yet, as introduced earlier, this focus on race does not tell the whole story of Southern coalitions and voting patterns, especially since the middle of the 20th century. Instead, that history shows the South moving toward and finally realizing the more diversity and fluidity in coalitions that marked the logic of *Federalist 10* and the theory of political parties as coalitions that occur within extended republics. It was a turn toward the normalized politics Madison envisioned and that usually occurred within other parts of the country. Thus, Byron Schafer and Richard Johnston titled their book, one giving non-racial factors as the dominant reasons for partisan re-alignment in the South, *The End of Southern Exceptionalism*.²¹

Other scholars also admit, even if grudgingly, that the partisan shift in the South involved much more than race. Carmines and Stanley wrote that, “[w]hile racial conflict may have precipitated, in part,

¹⁵ See Michael F. Holt, *The Rise and Fall of the Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

¹⁶ Gerald R. Webster, “Demise of the Solid South” *Geographical Review* 82(1)(Jan. 1992): 43-55.

¹⁷ Madison said in *Federalist 10* that, “the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property.” See Hamilton, Madison, Jay, 44.

¹⁸ James W. Prothro, Ernest Q. Campbell, and Charles M. Griff, “Two-Party Voting in the South: Class vs. Party Identification” *American Political Science Review* 52(1)(March 1958): 131.

¹⁹ Bruce Feldmen, *The Irony of the Solid South: Democrats, Republicans, and Race, 1865-1944* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2013), xii. The time period of Feldmen’s book is particularly helpful since his report argued that politics in the covered period (1865-1944) was mostly defined by race with changes coming in subsequent decades.

²⁰ Sundquist, 103. Gordon B. McKinney, “Southern Mountain Republicans and the Negro” *Journal of Southern History* 41(4)(Nov. 1975): 493-516.

²¹ Byron E. Schafer and Richard Johnston, *The End of Southern Exceptionalism: Class, Race, and Partisan Change in the Postwar South* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

conservative movement away from the Democratic Party, the transformation has been sustained by other issues.”²² In fact, the same influential political party scholars wrote in 1990 that, “Southern political conservatives are now out of tune with the Democratic party on a wide range of issues.”²³ In 2001, Aubrey Jewett concluded his study of increased GOP strength in Southern state legislatures between 1946-1995 by writing that, “the evidence supporting many other explanations of Republican legislative growth suggests that scholars who emphasize only race to the exclusion of other causal factors are being overly simplistic.”²⁴ Along the same lines, Earle and Merle Black in the 2002 book, *The Rise of Southern Republicans*, noted that, “modern southern politics involves more than its obvious racial divisions.”²⁵ By 2004, David Lublin declared about Southern politics, “I find little evidence of continuing white backlash” to the rise of full participation by African-Americans in the political process.²⁶ While still giving a significant place for race, Matthew D. Lassiter’s *Silent Majority* (2006) argued against “race reductionist” readings of American history that failed to account for how Southern metropolitan areas came to operate much like Northern counterparts and the place that social and economic class played in conscious political motivations of voters and policy-makers.²⁷

This report accepts as true that race once played a predominant role in Southern politics, including Alabama as part of the Deep South. But it will examine reasons to question the claim that race continues to possess the dominant explanatory power often given to it in this story. In so doing, it will look to other factors beyond race which made significant contributions to partisan re-alignment in the American South, including the state of Alabama, especially starting in the second half of the 20th century. This report, then, will argue that explaining the status of partisan politics in 2024 solely or predominately in racial terms leaves out too much of the backstory and too much other, reasonable explanations for current party alignment and voting patterns. For some time, a wide range of other issues have played a significant role. Those issues arose out of a broader, national ideological change within both parties to which we turn next.

Party Change—The Rise of the New Left and Modern Conservatism

1) *The Rise of the New Left*

The story of partisan alignment in the South, including Alabama, must begin with the Democratic Party. The South had been the base for the Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans, the precursor to the modern Democratic Party. It continued to be the stronghold for the Democratic Party that formed under Andrew Jackson’s leadership in the 1820s and 1830s.²⁸ The Democratic Party’s base

²² Edward G. Carmines and Harold W. Stanley, “Ideological Re-Alignment in the Contemporary South: Where Have All the Conservatives Gone?” in *The Disappearing South*, edited by Robert P. Steed, Laurence W. Moreland, and Tod A. Baker (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1990), 32.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Aubrey W. Jewett, “Partisan Changes in Southern Legislatures, 1946-1995” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 26(3)(August 2001): 479.

²⁵ Earle Black and Merle Black, *The Rise of Southern Republicans* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 4.

²⁶ Lublin, 28.

²⁷ Matthew D. Lassiter, *The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the Sunbelt South* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).

²⁸ Aldrich, 107-119.

remained in the South after the Civil War, too, intensified by the Republican Party's connection to the Union cause. Some attempts were made during Reconstruction to make the GOP competitive in the South but such efforts failed, especially once federal troops were withdrawn.²⁹ Still, the Republican Party became the national majority party after the end of the Civil War. Periods of closely contested elections and of divided government existed, especially at the end of Reconstruction in the latter 1870s and throughout the 1880s. However, the GOP reigned as the majority party through the greater portion of the years spanning 1865-1932.

The Great Depression opened up the potential for a new majority coalition. The Republican Party under President Herbert Hoover was thoroughly discredited in light of the economic collapse that shook the country and then settled into a new and harsh reality far different from the heady days of the "Roaring '20s." The Democratic landslide of 1932, under the leadership of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, railed against the GOP's failures as part of asserting their own ascent to political power.³⁰

The consequent New Deal coalition established the Democrats as the country's majority party for the first time since before the American Civil War. The Democratic Party built on the New Deal focused on economic issues. FDR's program sought much greater government involvement in regulating as well as participating in the economy. Thus, the coalition was defined predominately in economic terms, with working class or "blue-collar" Americans identifying decidedly with Democrats in their attempt to alleviate the hardships the Great Depression involved. This link we can see in President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's rhetoric in the period. In his First Inaugural, Roosevelt had lambasted, "the unscrupulous money changers" who "know only the rules of a generation of self-seekers."³¹ On the eve of his decisive re-election in 1936, FDR said, "I should like to have it said of my first Administration that in it the forces of selfishness and of lust for power met their match. I should like to have it said of my second Administration that in it these forces met their master."³² This placement of the Democratic Party with the working class, and against the wealthy, had a long pedigree going back to the original party system between the Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans and the Hamiltonian Federalists and then to Andrew Jackson railing against the "monied interests" that he equated with the Whig Party. However, the New Deal did more than renew that old distinction; it intensified it to a degree not seen since before the Civil War, if ever.

This coalition crossed racial bounds. A majority of African-Americans first began voting for the Democratic Party nationwide during the Great Depression.³³ This meant that Southern segregationists and African-Americans voted for decades for the same party.³⁴ Such a broad coalition wielded dominant results at the national and state levels with massive margins of victory for FDR in 1932 and 1936 as well

²⁹ Gordon B. McKinney, "Southern Mountain Republicans and the Negro" *Journal of Southern History* 41(4)(Nov. 1975): 493-516.

³⁰ Skowronek, *The Politics Presidents Make*, 288-289. See also H.W. Brands, *Traitor to His Class: The Privileged Life and Radical Presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt* (New York: Anchor Books, 2009), 238-239, 264-265.

³¹ Franklin Delano Roosevelt, "Inaugural Address" *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (New York: Random House, 1938), 2: 12.

³² Franklin Delano Roosevelt, "Address at Madison Square Garden, New York City" *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt* (New York: Random House, 1938), 5: 568-569.

³³ See Nancy Joan Weiss, *Farewell to the Party of Lincoln: Black Politics in the Age of F.D.R.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). See also Sidney M. Milkis, "Ideas, Institutions, and the New Deal Political Order" *American Political Thought* 3(1)(Spring 2014): 172.

³⁴ James C. Cobb, *South Atlantic Urban Studies* 1(1977): 255.

as huge majorities in Congress, governorships, and state legislatures. The GOP had been reduced to a rump party with little chance of contesting for a national majority.

However, the Madisonian-based theory of parties says that coalitions can be tenuous and fluid, especially when in the majority. New issues arise, both from competing parties but also from within the coalition itself. The New Deal coalition that had made the Democrats the dominant majority party began to show serious, enduring signs of strain in the early 1960s. The strain came internally when that period saw the rise of the self-defined “New Left.” Prominent intellectual C. Wright Mills penned “A Letter to the New Left” in 1960 working out how this form of liberalism distinguished itself from the now decades-dominant Old Left.³⁵

Mills argued that the Left’s primary focus on economic class no longer worked in the effort to pursue social justice. In the past, “the historic agency [of change] has been the working class...also parties and unions variously composed of members of the working class.”³⁶ But that no longer was true; the working class had become part of the problem of oppression, not the central means for finding new solutions to it. Instead, Mills pointed toward a new coalition that looked at the world as involving oppressors and oppressed but in relationships beyond labor versus capital. This perspective paved the way for a liberalism that focused on issues of racial justice and which began to discuss matters of women’s rights and LGBTQ rights. It also opened the door to expressing frustrations with American Cold War policy, especially on the nuclear arms race,³⁷ as well as a concern for environmental matters such as water and air pollution.³⁸ Taken together, the New Left was more willing to criticize American policy but, even more radical for the time, to also condemn America itself as inherently unjust, something that the much more patriotic-speaking New Deal Democrats did not do and would not have done.

Given the shift away from a focus on economic class, the New Left’s intellectual center would not be the union hall. Instead, its foundation would build from the college campus and include those with college degrees—itsself a growing population among the Baby Boomers. “It is with this problem of agency in mind,” Mills wrote, “that I have been studying, for several years now, the cultural apparatus, the intellectuals — as a possible, immediate, radical agency of change.”³⁹ Thus, the “Port Huron Statement” presented one of the most famous declarations of this new ideology’s views. Published on June 15, 1962, the document was written by Tom Hayden on behalf of the group “Students for a Democratic Society.”⁴⁰ The document claimed the perspective of a new generation, “housed now in universities, looking uncomfortably to the world we inherit.” That document further spoke of “the Southern struggle against racial bigotry.” The “Port Huron Statement” further observed the fear many had at the threat of nuclear war with the Soviet Union.⁴¹ It stated that “tarnish appear[ed] on our image

³⁵ C. Wright Mills, *The Politics of Truth: Selected Writings of C. Wright Mills*, edited by John H. Summers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 255-266.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 262.

³⁷ Paul Boyer, “From Activism to Apathy: The American People and Nuclear Weapons, 1963-1980” *Journal of American History* 70(4)(1984): 837-844.

³⁸ Keith M. Woodhouse, “The Politics of Ecology: Environmentalism and Liberalism in the 1960s” *Journal for the Study of Radicalism* 2(2)(Fall 2008): 53-84.

³⁹ Mills, 264.

⁴⁰ Jim Miller, *Democracy is in the Streets: From Port Huron to the Siege of Chicago* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987); See also *The Port Huron Statement: Sources and Legacies of the New Left’s Founding Manifesto*, edited by Richard Flacks and Nelson Lichtenstein (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).

⁴¹ “Port Huron Statement,” 3.

of American virtue" and it spoke of "the hypocrisy of American ideals."⁴² As the movement developed, these critiques also extended to the working class that had formed the backbone of the Democratic New Deal coalition. In a 1980 article, Sidney M. Wilhelm noted that, "working-class racism" challenged the Marxist economic paradigm which itself had sought to explain racism as the product of capitalism. Though he attempted to re-configure an economic underlying basis, he had to admit that working class Americans could take the side of oppressors.⁴³ As time would go on, certain intellectuals on the Left would make harsher critiques of working-class voters on their views regarding the issues on which the New Left now gave greater focus. They would more and more be seen as part of the problem rather than a full partner in the solution.

The rise of the New Left created a rift within the Democratic Party. Perhaps the best-known and most dramatic manifestation of this rift came during the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. The New Left subset sought renewed focus on civil rights and an end to the Vietnam War. Nicolas Proctor, in his book on the 1968 Convention, noted that, "conservative Democrats—particularly those from the South—argued the opposite."⁴⁴ They gave much greater support to American foreign policy and much less support to civil rights efforts. Chicago's Democratic Mayor, Richard Daley, sent police in to violently break-up these protesters in the streets, using clubs and tear-gas. Doing so did not result in restored peace and harmony within the Democratic Party, however. Subsequent changes in presidential selection strengthened the New Left within the Democratic Party as well. A mixed system had existed that permitted some say by voters in primaries but left substantial nominating power to the party itself regarding presidential candidates. In response to the McGovern-Fraser Commission, the Democratic Party moved to a system where the voters took effective control of the nomination-making through a process dominated by primaries or caucuses.⁴⁵ Nicol C. Rae noted that, starting in the 1970s, the new nomination process, "was structurally biased in favor of candidates from the party's neoliberal and New Left factions, with little appeal to most southern white voters."⁴⁶

In 1972, the New Left got one of their own nominated on the Democratic ticket for president: George McGovern.⁴⁷ He went on to a crushing defeat against sitting president Richard Nixon, winning only Massachusetts and D.C. for meagre 17 electoral votes to Nixon's 520. But the New Left would continue to exert a serious and growing influence over the Democratic Party. Bruce Miroff declared that, after McGovern, "the party would never again look like the urban-labor coalition of the New Deal era."⁴⁸ The New Left would move the Democratic Party's coalition to include more college-educated voters and to focus more on non-economic issues of gender, race, the environment, gun regulation, and other matters. Working Class voters would remain in the coalition but with increasing unease and decreasing

⁴² *Ibid.*, 4.

⁴³ Sidney M. Wilhelm, "Can Marxism Explain America's Racism?" *Social Problems* 28(2)(December 1980): 98-112.

⁴⁴ Nicolas Proctor, *Chicago, 1968: Policy and Protest at the Democratic National Convention* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2020).

⁴⁵ See Adam Hilton, *True Blues: The Contentious Transformation of the Democratic Party* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2021), 66-87; James W. Ceaser, *Presidential Selection: Theory and Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 260-303.

⁴⁶ Nicol C. Rae, *Southern Democrats* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 46.

⁴⁷ Bruce Miroff, *The Liberals' Moment: The McGovern Insurgency and the Identity Crisis of the Democratic Party* (Leavenworth University of Kansas Press, 2007).

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 1.

numbers.⁴⁹ For, in these developments, a growing section of the Democratic Party would expand on C. Wright Mills' implicit critique of the working class, arguing in more explicit terms that it perpetuated the forces of oppression on issues sex, sexuality, and race.

As time went on, the rise of the New Left bore fruit for the Democratic Party in some regions while hurting its electoral prospects in others. Jonathan Bell described how the new liberalism helped turn California into a reliably Democratic and Progressive state.⁵⁰ States like Massachusetts and others in the Northeast also became increasingly Democratic, despite for a long time being the regional electoral base for Republicans. But in the South, including Alabama, this turn in the Democratic Party bode ill for its long-term electoral viability, for reasons we will turn to soon.

2) *The Rise of Modern Conservatism*

The Republican Party developed during this time as well. In the 1920s, the party had been defined by policies of lower taxes, fiscal responsibility, and limited government linked to leaders like President Calvin Coolidge.⁵¹ This approach gained significant popularity during the economic boom of the 1920s but fell into disrepute, as noted above, during the Great Depression and in response to FDR's critiques. The Republican party did not regain any majority in Congress from 1932 until 1946. They did not recapture the White House until Dwight D. Eisenhower, hero of World War II, won the office in 1952. During the 1950s, the GOP had largely followed the "New Republicanism" of Eisenhower.⁵² This view sought moderation, arguing it would follow the New Deal consensus and manage its governmental programs in a restrained and efficient manner. It also looked to contain, not roll back, the forces of Communism led by the Soviet Union and China.⁵³

But portions of the Republican Party chafed under this new approach.⁵⁴ These men included Robert Taft, an Ohio Senator who was the main rival to Eisenhower for the GOP presidential nomination in 1952. First, this group sought to renew the GOP's pre-New Deal economic philosophy, critiquing FDR's policies as undermining American liberty. Second, many of the same Republicans wished to take a hard line against global Communism, defeating it outright rather than merely limiting its expansion. Third, they began to emphasize federalism on the level of governmental structure against an ever-growing national government. Fourth and finally, this group wished to emphasize traditional views on issues of religion and morality.

One can see this synthesis encapsulated in William F. Buckley's editorial announcing the first issue of *National Review*, published in November of 1955. Buckley wrote of "Conservatives" as those

⁴⁹ White working-class voters saw some limited success nationally, such as with the presidential candidacies of Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton. These national victories tended to need special circumstances, such as Watergate for Carter and the crushing defeats suffered by more New Left-aligned candidates preceding Carter's (McGovern) and Clinton's (Mondale, Dukakis) candidacies.

⁵⁰ See Jonathan Bell, *California Crucible: The Forging of Modern American Liberalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012).

⁵¹ See Amity Shlaes, *Coolidge* (New York: Harper Collins, 2013).

⁵² Randall Bennett Woods, *Quest for Identity: America Since 1945* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 73-98.

⁵³ John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, *The Right Nation: Conservative Power in America* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), 41-43.

⁵⁴ John Andrew, "The Struggle for the Republican Party in 1960" *The Historian* 59(3)(Spring 1997): 613-631.

"who have not made their peace with the New Deal."⁵⁵ Buckley decried a "relativism" that downplayed belief in God and would doubt, "the superiority of capitalism to socialism, of republicanism to centralism."⁵⁶ Anticipating Mills, he saw this view as growing on college campuses in particular.⁵⁷ In similar fashion, the Sharon Statement, put together in 1960 by young conservatives, with Buckley's help, praised the U.S. Constitution in that it, "reserves primacy to the several states, or to the people, in those spheres not specifically delegated to the Federal government." The document also lauded the "market economy," and declared that, "the forces of international Communism are, at present, the greatest single threat to these liberties."⁵⁸

These views would begin to cause tensions within the Republican Party at a similar time as the New Left threatened the cohesion and peace of the Democratic Party. Republicans' base had been in the North, especially New England. That was the home of what became known as "Rockefeller Republicans" after Nelson Rockefeller, long-time governor of New York and Vice-President under Gerald Ford. These Republicans held more moderate views, especially on social but also on economic issues, and were out-of-step with the emerging conservatism.⁵⁹ This upstart conservatism seemed more at home in the Western states instead. Thus, in 1964, Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater captured the GOP presidential nomination. Goldwater represented the emerging conservatism Buckley had articulated nearly a decade prior. In his acceptance speech, given in San Francisco, Goldwater declared that Republicans would act toward, "encouraging a free and a competitive economy" while also upholding "law and order." Goldwater spoke of a philosophy of limited government where the best place for its exercise was, "closest to the people involved." And he railed against the Soviet threat, saying, "communism and the governments it now controls are enemies of every man on earth who is or wants to be free."⁶⁰

Goldwater lost in decisive fashion to Lyndon Johnson in the Fall of 1964. He won only five states—his home state of Arizona and five states within the Deep South, including Alabama. But, as with the New Left in the Democratic Party, this emerging conservatism would not go away. It did suffer from the 1964 electoral setback. Richard Nixon would win the 1968 and 1972 presidential elections for the Republican Party. He rejected significant elements of Modern Conservatism, and, among other acts that frustrated conservatives, he instituted wage and price controls,⁶¹ created the Environmental Protection

⁵⁵ William F. Buckley, "Publisher's Statement" *National Review* November 19, 1955, 5. For a helpful discussion of Buckley's shift on race from the 1950s to the 1960s, one that included a rejection of southern segregation, see Alvin Felzenberg, *A Man and His Presidents: The Political Odyssey of William F. Buckley, Jr.* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017).

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ See also William F. Buckley, *God and Man at Yale: The Superstitions of Academic Freedom* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1951).

⁵⁸ See Greg L. Schneider, *Cadres for Conservatism: Young Americans for Freedom and the Rise of the Contemporary Right* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 34.

⁵⁹ Gary Miller and Norman Schofield, "Activists and Partisan Realignment in American Politics" *The American Political Science Review* 97(2)(May 2003): 257.

⁶⁰ Barry Goldwater, "Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in San Francisco" July 16, 1964. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-accepting-the-presidential-nomination-the-republican-national-convention-san>. Retrieved 3/18/2024.

⁶¹ Executive Order 11615 of August 15, 1971, Providing for Stabilization of Prices, Rents, Wages, and Salaries, 36 FR 17813; Executive Order 11627 of October 15, 1971, Further Providing for the Stabilization of the Economy, 36 FR 20139.

Agency,⁶² and signed both the National Environmental Policy Act⁶³ and the Clean Water Act.⁶⁴ In fact, a conservative Ohio Congressman, John Ashbrook, primaried the sitting president with the campaign slogan, "No Left Turns."⁶⁵ However, with Ronald Reagan's election in 1980, a Buckley-Goldwater kind of conservatism had gone mainstream, becoming the driving force within the Republican Party. Reagan had been a Goldwater supporter, giving one of the 1964 campaign's most famous speeches in his favor, "A Time for Choosing."⁶⁶ Then and in the 1980 campaign, Reagan spoke of limited government, private enterprise, deep opposition to communism, and traditional moral values. While some of these views continued to keep a significant portion of white-collar, highly educated voters in the GOP, working-class voters began to see elements of the GOP's conservative positions as attractive, too. The decisive shift in the GOP thus had ramifications for partisan alignments around the country, including the South.

In the pages that follow, this report will detail how the above developments in the Democratic and Republican parties participated in the South's slow-motion move from solidly Democratic to solidly Republican.

Civil Rights and voting patterns within the South

We begin with the focus for most discussions of Southern voting patterns: race and the Civil Rights Movement. The narrative states that Southern Democrats became frustrated with the national party over its embrace of African-American civil rights, first in 1948 and then again in 1964. The story of GOP gains in the South tends to focus especially on the 1964 election. There, Republican Presidential candidate Barry Goldwater won the Deep South for the GOP for the first time since Reconstruction, Alabama not only voted for Goldwater but gave him a massive 71% of the vote even though the state had not gone Republican since the Reconstruction era election of 1872. The story goes that the South broke with the Democratic Party over President Johnson shepherding through the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Southern white voters abandoned Democrats and ran to Republicans to maintain their race-based partisanship in a new political party, ironically the party formerly (but no more) of Abraham Lincoln, emancipation, Northern aggression, and Reconstruction.⁶⁷

The focus on 1964 applies one influential strain of the broader political party literature. This strain focused on critical elections that marked a significant and lasting shift in the composition of party coalitions as well as which of the major parties held lasting majority status. V. O. Key, a giant in the field of political parties' scholarship, was an early and influential articulator of this perspective.⁶⁸ A number of other scholars followed suit, pointing to elections such as 1800, 1832, 1860, possibly 1896, 1932, and

⁶² See "Reorganization Plan Nos. 3 of 1970," July 9, 1970, U.S. Code, Congressional and Administrative News, 91st Congress--2nd Session, Vol. 3, 1970.

⁶³ National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 852 (1970).

⁶⁴ An Act to amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 86 Stat. 816 (1972).

⁶⁵ Alfred S. Regnery, *Upstream: The Ascendancy of American Conservatism* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008), 141. Ashbrook would receive less than 10% of the vote in the primaries in which he participated before dropping out.

⁶⁶ *The Reagan Manifesto: A Time for Choosing and Its Influence*, edited by Eric D. Patterson and Jeffrey H. Morrison (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); H.W. Brands, *Reagan: The Life* (New York: Doubleday, 2015), 137-138.

⁶⁷ Angie Maxwell and Todd Shields, *The Long Southern Strategy: How Chasing White Voters in the South Changed American Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).

⁶⁸ See V. O. Key, "A Theory of Critical Elections" *Journal of Politics* 17(1955): 3-18; Key, "Secular Re-alignment and the Party System" *Journal of Politics* 21(1959): 3-18.

1980 as examples that inaugurated new, dominant party coalitions in American politics. In his influential work on the presidency, Stephen Skowronek placed American presidents within “political time,” which concerns cycles of political coalitions that ascend to power, struggle to maintain that dominance, and eventually get disrupted by a new ascendant coalition.⁶⁹ He also used a theory of critical or realigning elections to help explain his “political time.” In much of this scholarship, 1964 can mark a critical election that did not create a new electoral majority but did shift the South to the GOP.⁷⁰

Other scholars rightly pushed back against this theory as not fully explaining the historical development of political parties. One strain argued that some realignments occur more slowly, across multiple elections, spanning even decades before coming to some form of completion.⁷¹ While some have tried to explain the South’s move from predominately Democratic-leaning to Republican through the critical election theory (mostly focused on 1964), others have committed to a more gradual model that says the racial component slowly worked its way toward the partisan shift.

This report will challenge both those narratives. One cannot reduce the shift in political loyalties in the South either to one election or to one issue set like race. As noted above, the fuller story spans close to a century of American history.

Potential GOP prospects in the South arose as early as 1928. At the presidential level, Republicans won what is known in scholarship as the “peripheral South.” This sub-region included Texas, Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina, and Florida. But that election had notable results even in the Deep South, defined as Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina.⁷² In Alabama, for example, Democrat Al Smith won with only 51% of the vote and over 43% in Georgia. Some attribute this outcome to race-based issues, since Smith was more open than most Democrats of the time to African-American civil rights.⁷³ But the bigger issue in 1928, other than economic prosperity of the “Roaring 20s” being credited to Republicans, was that Al Smith was Roman Catholic. This point caused consternation in the very Protestant Southern portion of the Democratic Party, where centuries-old views questioning Roman Catholic loyalty and capacity to adapt to non-authoritarian regimes.

Moreover, this report must note where within those states the GOP did well. Republican gains were focused in urban or metropolitan centers, not rural areas, both in the Peripheral and the Deep South.⁷⁴ V. O. Key pointed out as early as 1949 that Republican strength in that earlier election was higher in urban as opposed to rural portions of the South.⁷⁵ This trend continued in subsequent electoral contests. Even in the wipeout election of 1932, Herbert Hoover performed better in Southern cities like Charlotte, Richmond, and Dallas than Republican candidates had in their decisive national victories

⁶⁹ See Stephen Skowronek, *The Politics Presidents Make*

⁷⁰ Black & Black, 4, 28; James E. Campbell, “Party Systems and Realignment in the United States, 1868-2004” *Social Science History* 30(3)(Fall 2006): 370.

⁷¹ See Edward G. Carmines and James A. Simpson, “Issue Evolution, Population Replacement, and Normal Partisan Change” *American Political Science Review* 75(1981): 107-118.

⁷² Earle Black and Merle Black, *Politics and Society in the South* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 14

⁷³ At the same time, Herbert Hoover garnered a paltry 18% of the vote in Mississippi and under 9% in South Carolina.

⁷⁴ The Deep South included Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina. M.V. Hood III and Seth C. McKee, *Rural Republican Realignment in the Modern South: The Untold Story* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2022), 12.

⁷⁵ Key, 328.

throughout the 1920s.⁷⁶ In the 1950s, Dwight D. Eisenhower's victories in the Peripheral South as well as his improved percentages in the Deep South came overwhelmingly from urban or metropolitan areas. For example, Donald Strong pointed out that, in the 1950 census, Mountain Brook, Alabama had the highest median income of any city in the state. In 1952, it voted for Republican Eisenhower over Democrat Adlai Stevens by a margin of nearly 4-1.⁷⁷ The three counties that contained Birmingham, Mobile, and Montgomery all voted by margins notably above the state average of 35% for Eisenhower. Strong would find a similar urban, upper-class strength in the Deep South, including Alabama, for Eisenhower in his 1956 re-election. Bernard Cosman then continued the examination in 1960, finding Richard Nixon, though in a losing national effort, garnered strong margins in the urban South comparable to Ike.⁷⁸

Scholars see this as the start of what has been called, "Metropolitan Republicanism" in the South. The Republican Party's revived prospects came not just in the South's periphery. It also developed *within* Southern states in particular areas, not others. Most notably, as the phrase, "Metropolitan Republicanism" relates, the GOP gained not in rural but in urban portions of the states. As these areas grew in population, so would Republican prospects. Therefore, James C. Cobb in 1977 noted that, "[t]he South's cities seem to be the logical place to begin further analyses of southern Republicanism."⁷⁹ These cities, especially in what later came to be distinguished as "suburbs," proved the base for the rising GOP successes.

The main point to consider here is that, as Sundquist noted, these gains were "durable."⁸⁰ Slow and steady, they formed a definite and consistent trend in Southern voting patterns. Contrast these gains with two elections which some point to as hard moves away from Democrats and toward Republicans in the South. The first was in 1948. The Democratic Party experienced a temporary revolt from its Southern ranks in the form of Dixiecrats who were angry at President Truman and the national party's stance on African-American civil rights. Led by Senator Strom Thurmond, this contingent won Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, South Carolina, and one electoral vote from the state of Tennessee.⁸¹ Yet these disgruntled Democrats did not move into the Republican ranks.⁸² In fact, Thurmond won those states in part because he was made the official Democratic nominee on the ballot within them. After the election, these voters mostly returned to the Democratic fold; they did not join the Republican party.⁸³ Moreover, Thurmond's best voting regions were not predominately from groups and areas trending toward Republicans but from regions of continued Democratic strength.⁸⁴ Thurmond would switch to

⁷⁶ Phillips, *Emerging Republican Majority*, 161.

⁷⁷ Donald S. Strong, "The Presidential Election in the South, 1952" *Journal of Politics* 17(3)(August 1955): 343.

⁷⁸ Bernard Cosman, "Presidential Republicanism in the South, 1960" *Journal of Politics* 24(2)(May 1962): 303-322. See also Black & Black, *Politics and Society in the South*, 265.

⁷⁹ James C. Cobb, "Urbanization and the Changing South: A Review of the Literature" *South Atlantic Urban Studies* 1(1977): 263.

⁸⁰ Sundquist, 279.

⁸¹ Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 52-53.

⁸² Sundquist, 275.

⁸³ Black and Black, *Rise of Southern Republicanism*, 208.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 276. Thurmond would switch to the Republican Party but not until September of 1964. See Nadine Cohodas, *Strom Thurmond and the Politics of Southern Change* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1993), 450-452.

the GOP though not until 1964—16 years later. Even then, as Dr. Kari Frederickson notes in her report, “Strom Thurmond’s party-switching remained a singular act”⁸⁵ with very few politicians following suit.

The other election—1964—is where many scholars focus the narrative of Republican ascendance in the South. As noted above, that election saw a sudden rise in GOP support, most of it concentrated in the presidential candidacy of Barry Goldwater. Goldwater did very well in the Deep South and the rural portions of it, the opposite of the trends for the GOP up to that point. Republicans did make some gains below the presidential ticket, including gaining five seats in United States House delegation from Alabama. However, Republicans gave back a significant portion of these gains. In the next congressional election, Alabama’s house delegation reverted to majority Democratic, not to change back again until 1996. In 1968, Richard Nixon received just shy of 14% of the state’s vote, coming in third place behind avowed segregationist and Alabama Governor George Wallace as well as Democratic nominee Hubert Humphrey. Governor Wallace did especially well in rural areas, not those where GOP strength had been growing slowly in previous decades.⁸⁶

Thus, the GOP’s lasting growth occurred in the metropolitan and suburban areas during this period, not rural. Rural areas, with the exception of 1964, remained the bedrock group voting for Democrats or for splinter Democratic candidates like George Wallace. This observation matters in assessing the growth of the GOP among white voters in Southern states like Alabama. Rural areas were considered the most committed to maintaining the old ways and most resistant to reform, especially on matters of race.⁸⁷ Those areas, more than urban ones, would seem more likely to seek party change in response to Democrat deviation from racial orthodoxy as the voting patterns in most of these elections support. Metropolitan areas tended to be more diverse in population and open to reform, including on matters related to race. Moreover, the metropolitan areas during these decades saw an influx of persons immigrating from other parts of the country, including the Midwest, bringing with them more GOP votes and less segregationist attitudes. In fact, by 2009 about 1/3 of those living in the South were born in other regions of the country. And most transplants were to urban/suburban areas where Republicans did increasingly well electorally and who fit well within traditionally Republican-friendly constituencies.⁸⁸ Thus, Key observed that, even in the deep South, it was true that at times “urbanism apparently outweighed racial restraints.”⁸⁹

After 1968, the South showed greater willingness to vote Republican at the presidential level. It voted for Nixon in 1972 and for Reagan and George H.W. Bush in the 1980s. However, these all were landslide elections where the Republican candidate dominated across the country. It also did not translate elsewhere down the ticket: the region remained dominantly, stubbornly Democrat in every other electoral sphere. Lublin noted that a shift in the South to a Republican majority anywhere below

⁸⁵ Kari Frederickson, “Race and Politics in Twentieth-Century Alabama,” Initial Report, 25.

⁸⁶ David Knoke and Constance Henry, “The Political Structure of Rural America” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 429(January 1977): 56.

⁸⁷ Louis Wirth, “Urbanism as a Way of Life,” *American Journal of Sociology* 64 (July 1938): 1-24; 5 Charles O. Lerche, *The Uncertain South* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), 236.

⁸⁸ Irwin L. Morris, *Movers and Stayers: The Partisan Transformation of 21st Century Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021). See also Richard K. Scher, *Politics in the New South: Republicanism, Race and Leadership in the Twentieth Century*, 2nd Ed. (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997). In the 21st century, this in-migration tended to help Democrats more, though that shift came well after the GOP became not just competitive but favored in the region. See Hood, McKee, *Rural Republican Realignment*, 251-253.

⁸⁹ Key, 321.

the presidential level seemed to be a political version of “waiting for Godot.”⁹⁰ For thirty years after the Civil Rights Movement supposedly drove the South into the arms of the GOP, Democrats “held the preponderance of governorships as well as congressional seats” while “Democratic dominance appeared even greater at the state legislative and local levels.”⁹¹ For instance, as late as 1991 Democrats held a 77 to 39 advantage over the GOP—essentially 2-1—among Congressional delegations.⁹²

It was not until 1994 that Republicans won a majority of House districts in the South—thirty years after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and twenty-nine after the enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Republicans also won a majority in the North in that election, a double-feat not accomplished since 1872.⁹³ Even crossing this threshold did not result in the immediate collapse of the Democratic Party in the South, which gained some seats in Congress, governorships, and state legislatures back in subsequent elections during the rest of the 1990s and ceded the ground it did in the South only begrudgingly.⁹⁴ It took till the 2000 presidential election for a Republican to win the entire South in a non-blowout contest.

The slowness of this change matters considering the actual voters involved. By 1994, a significant generational shift in voting population from 1964 had taken place. This shift only becomes more pronounced in the 2020s. The most recent census data showed that only 18% of Alabama residents are over the age of 65.⁹⁵ The voters that revolted against the Democrats in 1948 and 1964, then generally returned, comprise a small and shrinking portion of the electorate. The rise of Republican strength in the region in the post-Civil Rights era coincided with not only migration from other parts of the country but also new generations accounting for an increasing segment of the voting public. In fact, research has pointed to “replacement” of older, native voters as one notable contributor to the GOP’s ascendancy in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. From the 1980s till 2000, for instance, the average rural Southerner who identified as a Republican was ten years younger than his Democratic-affiliated counterpart.⁹⁶ Green, Palmquist, and Schickler claim that as much as half of white Southern voters’ migration to the GOP was generational replacement.⁹⁷

Moreover, this story includes a further normalization of Southern voting patterns. Consider the slow-motion change in rural partisan preferences between North and South. For most post-Civil War history, the Republican Party’s Northern base was rural with Democrats doing better among the more Roman Catholic, immigrant populations of cities. In the South, as noted before, Republicans did better in cities, though not that well, while Democrats dominated among that region’s rural voters. However, that began to change after the era of Civil Rights. Rural voting patterns began to converge between North and South. Thus, Southern rural voters began to vote more like their counterparts across the country. By 2004, southern rural voters were slightly more Republican in voting patterns than their corresponding

⁹⁰ David Lublin, *The Republican South: Democratization and Partisan Change* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004S), 1.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² Black & Black, 13.

⁹³ Black & Black, 2.

⁹⁴ Lublin, 2.

⁹⁵ “Quick Facts: Alabama,” United States Census Bureau.

<https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/AL/PST045223>. Accessed 3/27/2024.

⁹⁶ Hood, McKee, *Rural Republican Realignment*, 28.

⁹⁷ Donald Green, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler, *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).

Northern rural voters.⁹⁸ It marked the South becoming more like the rest of the country in its voting patterns rather than maintaining a distinctiveness that before more comported with voting in a dominantly race-conscious manner. Not until the 2010s did rural Southerner whites align with the GOP more than urban whites.⁹⁹

In sum, this move from Democrat to Republican in the South hardly seems explainable predominantly by race. Beyond the statistics, we also have evidence that the Republican Party did not seek to go to the segregationists who had supported Strom Thurmond in 1948 and George Wallace in 1968. Some have argued that Republicans made sustained racial appeals but in more subdued or cloaked terms. Black and Black, for instance, argue in their 2002 book that Republicans from Nixon onward took this route with Goldwater as an earlier set-up.¹⁰⁰ This theory became known as the GOP's "Southern Strategy," which, some insist, continues to this day. For example, Dr. Frederickson opines that "white identity politics occup[ies] the center of Republican politics"¹⁰¹ now and since at least the Civil Rights Movement of the mid-20th century. She relies heavily on the GOP's "Southern Strategy" as inherently and perpetually grounded in white supremacy to make this argument. There are a number of concerns with her interpretation of the relevant history and with that of others who accept race as dominant in this tale.

For one, consider the case of Barry Goldwater. Goldwater had opposed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and campaigned vigorously in the South in the Fall of 1964, downplaying the civil rights issue there for the sake of getting votes. But he was far from a model segregationist. He had voted for the 1957 and 1960 civil rights bills, desegregated his own family business, integrated the Arizona Air National Guard and U.S. Senate cafeteria.¹⁰² And his opposition to the 1964 Civil Rights Act rested on grounds that the law, while moral in intent, violated the Constitutional distribution of powers, especially between state and national governments.¹⁰³

For another, take the campaigns and presidency of Richard Nixon. Frederickson admits that Nixon was no George Wallace. She says, though, that Nixon wooed Southern white segregationists in that he, "established a politically safe terrain by simultaneously affirming his belief in the principles of equality while opposing the use of federal intervention to enforce compliance."¹⁰⁴

Nixon indeed consistently affirmed his belief in racial equality before the law. In his first inaugural address, Nixon declared:

No man can be fully free while his neighbor is not. To go forward at all is to go forward together. This means black and white together, as one nation, not two. The laws have caught up with our conscience. What remains is to give life to what is in the law: to

⁹⁸ Seth E. McKee, "Rural Voters and Polarization of American Presidential Elections" *PS: Political Science and Politics* 41(1)(January 2008): 102.

⁹⁹ Hood, McKee, *Rural Republican Realignment*, 24.

¹⁰⁰ Black & Black, *Rise of Southern Republicans*, 216, 277.

¹⁰¹ Frederickson, 4.

¹⁰² See "Where Barry Stands" *Time* August 2, 1963. <https://time.com/archive/6807933/nation-where-barry-stands/>. Accessed August 11, 2024; Lee Edwards, *Goldwater: The Man Who Made a Revolution* (Regnery: 1995).

¹⁰³ See Jeffrey K. Tulis and Nicole Mellow, *Legacies of Losing in American Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018), 110.

¹⁰⁴ Frederickson, 24.

insure at last that as all are born equal in dignity before God, all are born equal in dignity before man.¹⁰⁵

Statements of this kind were not atypical for Nixon nor new in his political career. In fact, Richard Nixon hardly fit the bill for the person to morph the GOP into the party of white supremacy. He held a long record of support for civil rights, including *Brown v. Board of Education* and the civil rights acts of 1957 and 1960. Unlike Barry Goldwater, Nixon also had endorsed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and efforts leading to the Voting Rights Act of 1965.¹⁰⁶ In 1967, Nixon granted an interview with the *New York Times* where he said, "people in the ghetto have to have more than an equal chance. They should be given a dividend" in response to the history they had experienced of discrimination.¹⁰⁷

Frederickson argues Nixon's policies regarding civil rights supports the racial element of the "Southern Strategy." The Nixon Administration did pursue a moderate approach to enforcing civil rights. As president, Nixon opted for fewer hard deadlines for desegregation, moving much of its enforcement from the executive branch to the judiciary as well as supporting more cooperative efforts to get Southern schools to integrate.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, he opposed school busing as the means to integrate public schools.

But hanging the hat of white supremacy on these factors does not hold up well in light of the broader history. While making an argument for a Southern Strategy, Black & Black note that, "Nixon positioned himself to southern voters as opposed to segregation but favoring only voluntary integration."¹⁰⁹ Such a position would be quite the concession for white supremacists to take in their voting preferences. But even that description does not fairly describe Nixon's policies. Nixon's desegregation plan still included substantial Justice Department-initiated litigation, which Dean Kotlowski notes, "offended many white southerners" and thus made "questionable whether Nixon had swapped civil rights enforcement for southern votes as his critics complained."¹¹⁰ After these executive branch lawsuits began, a record number of African-American school children went to integrated schools in the Fall of 1969.

The school busing policies, moreover, were not the only method or necessarily considered the best method for pursuing integration. They also were deeply unpopular, not merely the scourge of Southern segregationists. A Harris Poll from 1975 found that Americans supported desegregation by a 56%-35% margin while the same sample opposed busing 75%-20%.¹¹¹ Thus, a number of voters did not

¹⁰⁵ Richard Nixon, "Inaugural Address" *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and States of the President: 1969* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1971), 3.

¹⁰⁶ Ronald Sullivan, "Back Rights Bill, Nixon Urges" *New York Times* June 16, 1964, 22. Joseph A. Loftus, "Senate's Leaders Seek Voting Bill: Mansfield and Dirksen Say They Want a Simple Plan" *New York Times* March 11, 1965, 19.

¹⁰⁷ "Nixon Gives Views on Aid to Negroes and to the Poor" *New York Times*, December 20, 1967, 22.

¹⁰⁸ Hugh Davis Graham, "Richard Nixon and Civil Rights: Explaining an Enigma" *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 26(1)(Winter 1996): 94.

¹⁰⁹ Black & Black, *Rise of Southern Republicans*, 210.

¹¹⁰ Kotlowski, 24.

¹¹¹ *New York Times*, October 5, 1975, pg. 59. A Washington Post poll in 1978 found that only 25% of Americans agreed with the statement that "racial integration of the schools should be achieved even if it requires busing." See Laura Meckler, "Effective But Never Popular, Court-Ordered Busing is a Relic Few Would Revive" *Washington Post*, July 7, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/effective-but-never-popular-court-ordered-busing-is-a-relic-few-would-revive/2019/07/07/dcc439c8-9d40-11e9-b27f-ed2942f73d70_story.html. Retrieved 6/3/2024.

see busing as essential to achieving the goal of desegregation, a goal with which they agreed. Importantly, these statistics also revealed far from boisterous support from African-Americans. In a 1973 Gallup poll, for example, only 9% of African-Americans rated school busing at the top of their list of the best means for integration.¹¹²

Dr. Frederickson quotes an Alabama newspaper from the time heralding that “Nixon Keeps His Word.” But if Nixon was trying to signal subtly to white supremacists that he was on their side, he sold them a false bill of goods. His rhetoric hardly gave much to them in the first place, extolling racial equality. And his policies did not deliver on segregationist priorities. Simply put, Nixon failed to stop desegregation, instead helping bear considerable fruit on that front. In 1968, 68% of black children in the South attended single-race schools. That number had plummeted to 8% by 1972, the year Nixon ran for re-election. Far from coming despite Nixon, these welcome results happened in part due to his administration’s efforts.

In addition, Nixon compiled a number of other concrete policy accomplishments on civil rights. His budget proposals to Congress asked to increase funding for enforcing civil rights from \$75 million to \$2.6 billion between 1969 and 1972.¹¹³ In 1970, he approved a new IRS policy denying tax exempt status to all-white private schools, a move that especially went after institutions in the South trying to avoid public school integration.¹¹⁴ Nixon privately declared the move would not help him politically but made the call regardless.¹¹⁵ Nixon also played a significant part in the development of affirmative action programs. His “Revised Philadelphia Plan” built upon existing policies requiring those receiving federal funds to show some kind of affirmative action in their procedures. Rather than gut this program, he revived and enhanced it. In particular, the Revised Philadelphia Plan” focused on government contracts for construction jobs. Nixon did not take this route for political ease. He faced significant pressure from Congress to end all affirmative action requirements within the bureaucracy with Elmer P. Staats, the Comptroller General, declaring such plans illegal in November of 1968, the same month Nixon was elected president.¹¹⁶ This opposition included Southern politicians, among them Democratic Senators John McClellan of Arkansas and Sam Ervin of North Carolina.¹¹⁷ But Nixon forged ahead, doing something the Johnson Administration had not on this issue: establishing numerical requirements for minority hiring among those entities eligible for government contracts with concrete timetables attached.¹¹⁸ This policy, far from a new attempt to woo Southern segregationists, went beyond Nixon’s former position in favor of persuasion over coercion when he was Vice-President under Eisenhower.¹¹⁹

¹¹² “Gallup Finds Few Favor Busing for Integration” *New York Times*, September 9, 1973, 55.

¹¹³ <https://www.nytimes.com/1973/09/09/archives/gallup-finds-few-favor-busing-for-integration.html>. Retrieved 6/4/2024.

¹¹⁴ Graham, 95.

¹¹⁵ Eileen Shanahan, “Private Schools that Bar Blacks to Lose Tax Aid” *New York Times* July 11, 1970, 1.

¹¹⁶ <https://www.nytimes.com/1970/07/11/archives/private-schools-that-bar-blacks-to-lose-tax-aid-irs-policy-is.html>. Retrieved 6/4/2024.

¹¹⁷ Kotlowski, 25.

¹¹⁸ J. Larry Hood, “The Nixon Administration and the Revised Philadelphia Plan for Affirmative Action: A Study in Expanding Presidential Power and Divided Government” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 23(1)(Winter 1993): 147-150.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 150.

¹²⁰ Dean J. Kotlowski, “Richard Nixon and the Origins of Affirmative Action,” *The Historian* 60(3)(Spring 1998): 528-530.

¹²¹ See also Kotlowski, “Richard Nixon and the Origins of Affirmative Action,” 533.

In fact, Joan Hoff has argued that Nixon has received too little credit for his advancement of civil rights during his career, including his presidency.¹²⁰ Any assessment of his so-called “Southern Strategy” that is based in alleged subtle racial language must account for the above (and additional) explicit words and deeds promoting the advancement of civil rights. Thus, while Nixon’s less-aggressive approach to civil rights might have been more attractive to segregationist elements in the South than Humphrey in 1968 or McGovern in 1972, Nixon’s policies nevertheless seriously undermined the segregationist and white supremacist agenda. White supremacists’ choice came down more on how to lose the legal and political battle, not whether they would lose.

One point sometimes lost in these discussions is the weak position Southern segregationists were in as the Civil Rights Movement won out and how the Republican Party itself understood this weakness. In 1968, Nixon won the presidency without the votes of the Southerners who cast ballots in droves for the Southern segregationist.¹²¹ Though the margin was narrow, the GOP still could win without the Deep South. In 1969, Kevin Phillips, who then worked in the Nixon Administration, published his famous book, *The Emerging Republican Majority*. In summing up trends toward the GOP in the South, Phillips emphasized the incapacity of segregationists to continue as a relevant factor in American politics. He wrote that “For national political reasons, the Republican Party cannot go to the Deep South, but...the Deep South must soon go to the GOP.”¹²² In other words, the South’s move to the GOP would be more on the latter’s terms, not the former’s. And these terms would have less to do with race and more to do with a combination of economic, foreign policy, and social issues then percolating within the parties and across the country due to the New Left and Modern Conservatism.

Studies bore this point out at least as early as the 1980s. In an examination of voter attitudes between 1980-1988, Alan Abramowitz found that the claim of the centrality of race in explaining partisan behavior was “quite limited,” despite so many scholars assuming its truth.¹²³ He critiqued the findings focused on race for the same basic reason this report questions them: failure to account for other issues, events, and developments that have as much or more explanatory power. The narrow view obscured the broader story.

Dr. Frederickson also claims the race-based “Southern Strategy” continued with Reagan. Her very quick assessment, as with Nixon, makes claims that unnoted evidence points against. To give one example: in 1982, President Reagan signed an extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In doing so, he agreed to amendments strengthening the law’s power by replacing §2’s discriminatory intent requirement with an effects test. In fact, African-American civil rights leaders declared that Reagan had given them “everything we wanted.”¹²⁴

Though her short analysis effectively ends with the end of the 20th century, Frederickson concludes that the Republican Party continues to this day to be the “white party” and that it has, “adopted a host of conservative policy positions that had race at their core.”¹²⁵ In fact, she asserts that basically all major conservative and Republican positions, including, “taxes, spending, education, crime,

¹²⁰ Joan Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered* (New York: Basic Books, 1994).

¹²¹ Gerard Alexander, “The Myth of Racist Republicans,” *Claremont Review of Books* IV(2)(Spring 2004).

¹²² Phillips, 233.

¹²³ Alan I. Abramowitz, “Issue Evolution Reconsidered: Racial Attitudes and Partisanship in the U.S. Electorate” *American Journal of Political Science* 38(1)(February 1994) :2.

¹²⁴ “Voting Rights Act Extension by the Senate Seen Likely as Dole Engineers Compromise,” *Wall Street Journal*, May 4, 1982.

¹²⁵ Frederickson, 29.

and welfare, as well as the promotion of what came to be known as ‘family values’ issues” all really were driven by racial attitudes.¹²⁶

This broad-brush claim shows serious difficulties with the narrative of a race-dominant Southern Strategy. It often falls back on what Dr. Joseph Bagley calls “colormasking”—subtle appeals to racial anxiety or animosity hidden underneath overt language of racial equality.¹²⁷ Thereby, as Frederickson claims, nearly all if not all Republican and conservative appeals ultimately are racial in origin and intent, regardless of what is explicitly stated.

Likely for support on this claim, she ends with a quote from Maxwell and Fields’ book, *The Long Southern Strategy*. That work demonstrates wider problems with the attempt to make race so central to Southern politics in particular and even to American politics more generally. It attempts to place alleged racial appeals within a broader strategy by the GOP regarding sex, sexuality, and religion. It paints a picture of a GOP committed to oppression across most cultural and political questions with race as only one element. But whatever the merits of that argument, it undermines the dominance of race as an explanatory factor by admitting that many other issues distinct from race contributed to the South’s move to the GOP. It attributes increasing prominence to questions regarding women’s rights and economics. At least one of its author’s even emphasizes a religious basis underlying and thus cohering many of these views.¹²⁸

Moreover, a related issue is the problem of deciphering the masked motivation undergirding a particular view or policy as dominated by race. As noted above, it is not clear that opposition to busing was due primarily to racist attitudes, since some did oppose these policies while still supporting integration. Affirmative action is another example. Does the evidence show that Republicans by and large oppose affirmative action and other race-conscious policies because they desire to discriminate against blacks or because they believe in a “color-blind” Constitution, the very argument raised by Justice John Marshall Harlan in his dissent against legalized segregation in *Plessy v. Ferguson*?¹²⁹ Similarly, some, like Dr. Bagley, interpret advocacy for “school choice” along with opposition to the teaching of critical race theory in primary schools as racially motivated rather than coming from a commitment to bettering education for all children.¹³⁰ But that cannot be reconciled with the fact that school choice, for example, continues to garner significant and increasing backing from members of all races.¹³¹ Non-racial reasons certainly can explain policy preferences on these issues. Likewise, a belief in greater border security regarding immigration is seen by Dr. Bagley and others as signaling racial

¹²⁶ Frederickson, 29.

¹²⁷ Joseph Bagley, Declaration, *Milligan v. Merrill*, December 10, 2021, at 1, 3, 26; Bagley, Third Expert Report, *Milligan v. Allen*, May 17, 2024, at 1, 24.

¹²⁸ “[T]he [Republican] party worked to reframe its positions on a host of domestic issues, ranging from health care to foreign policy, into matters of religious belief.” See Angie Maxwell, “What We Get Wrong About the Southern Strategy” *Washington Post*, July 26, 2019, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/07/26/what-we-get-wrong-about-southern-strategy/>. Retrieved 6/5/2014.

¹²⁹ Compare Richard Johnson, “The 1982 Voting Rights Act Extension as a ‘Critical Juncture’: Ronald Reagan, Bob Dole, and Republican Party-Building” *Studies in American Political Development* 35(2)(October 2021): 224; with Matthew Lassiter, *The Silent Majority*, and Abramowitz, *supra* note 123.

¹³⁰ Bagley, Third Expert Report, at 30-31

¹³¹ See Mike McShane, “A Decade of Public Polling on Education” *Forbes*, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikemcshane/2022/09/30/a-decade-of-public-opinion-on-education/>. Retrieved 6/27/2024; Denisha Allen, “School Choice Really is the Civil Rights Issue of Our Time” *The Hill* February 14, 2024, <https://thehill.com/opinion/education/4465271-school-choice-really-is-the-civil-rights-issue-of-our-time/>. Retrieved 6/27/2024.

animosity, even when substantial numbers of Latino and African-American voters support such policies.¹³²

This practice of casting each and every conservative policy as containing some element of white supremacy paints a simplistic picture and inappropriately diminishes non-racial reasons explaining voter behavior. Unfortunately, this continues to infect the scholarship.¹³³ But it has also gained new traction in the public arena. For example, former attorney general Eric Holder recently claimed that Alabama's redistricting actions in this case "mirrored the sordid history of the Jim Crow era."¹³⁴ And President Biden described Georgia's attempts to regulate its elections as "Jim Crow 2.0."¹³⁵ And his questioning whether a "real" black person could vote for Republicans suffered from the same problem of assuming rather than showing racial animus.¹³⁶

In what follows, we will look beyond the numbers at the ways that the South came to the GOP and moved away from the Democratic Party. Shifts in all three—the South, GOP, and Democrats—contributed to these changes.

Economics and Role of Government

First, this report will discuss the issue of economic development. In 2008, Gary Miller and Normal Schofield pegged the Republican Party's unity to being "pro-business."¹³⁷ The American public held this view of the GOP going back into the 19th century, when post-Civil War Republicans sought to protect American business through tariffs and spent significant government dollars helping develop railroads and other infrastructure. In the North, this power stretched to rural areas, in part due to the

¹³² Bagley, Third Expert Report, at 30. An April poll found that 42% of Latinos in the US supported a border wall with significant support for deportation (38%) and majority (64%) for shutting down the Southern border as a potential policy tool. See Russell Contreras, "Exclusive Poll: Latino support for border wall, deportation jumps" *Axios* April 11, 2024, <https://www.axios.com/2024/04/11/poll-latino-support-border-wall-deportations-jumps>. Retrieved June 10, 2024. In a Pew poll this Spring, 33% of surveyed Latinos said that increasing deportations of those here against the law would make the current situation "better" while 26% said "worse" (with 19% saying it would not make much of a difference). See, "Latino's Views on the Migrant Situation at the U.S.-Mexico Border" Pew Research Center, March 4, 2024, <https://www.pewresearch.org/race-and-ethnicity/2024/03/04/latinos-views-on-the-migrant-situation-at-the-us-mexico-border/>. Retrieved 6/10/2024.

¹³³ One academic example would be Alan Abramowitz, whose 1990s work was cited earlier. His later work also tends to code certain issues, like opposition to affirmative action, school busing, and greater restrictions on immigration, as inherently racial in nature. See Alan I. Abramowitz, *The Great Realignment: Race, Party Transformation, and the Rise of Donald Trump* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018). On this point, see also Larry M. Bartels, "Ethnic Antagonism Erodes Republicans' Commitment to Democracy" *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 117(37)(September 15, 2020).

¹³⁴ Quoted in Joseph D. Bryant, "Supreme Court Ruling 1 Year Ago Today Changed Alabama's Congressional Map" *AL.com* June 8, 2024, <https://www.al.com/news/2024/06/supreme-court-ruling-1-year-ago-today-changed-alabamas-congressional-map.html>. Accessed June 11, 2024.

¹³⁵ See Joseph Biden, "Remarks by President Biden on Protecting the Right to Vote" *The White House* <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/01/11/remarks-by-president-biden-on-protecting-the-right-to-vote/>. Retrieved June 11, 2024.

¹³⁶ Quote by President Biden in Eric Bradner, Sarah Mucha, and Arlette Saenz, "Biden: 'If You Have a Problem Figuring Out Whether You're for Me or Trump, then You Ain't Black'" *CNN.com*, <https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/22/politics/biden-charlamagne-the-god-you-aint-black/index.html>, Retrieved June 11, 2024.

¹³⁷ Miller and Schofield, 433-436.